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ABSTRACT
The two studies presented here examined factors that might affect teams’ and
individuals’ tendency to follow outside advice when attempting to solve a complex
problem known as letters-to-numbers. Past research on group dynamics suggests that a
lack of group consensus or homogeneity reduces group members’ confidence in their
group’s abilities, and may lead members both to seek and accept advice from outside the
group. Study 1 experimentally manipulated group diversity in task performance strategies
in order to investigate whether dyads whose members have divergent perspectives are
more likely than homogeneous dyads to consider and use a problem-solving strategy
presented from a source outside the group when trying to solve a letters-to-numbers
problem. Experimental sessions were videotaped to allow for observational analysis.
Mixed results suggested that diverse-strategy dyads may have been better at processing
task-relevant information and had more productive discussions than same-strategy dyads.
Study 2 sought to examine the role of confidence in taking outside advice at the
individual level. Individuals attempted to solve two letters-to-numbers problems. On the
first, the problem was made easier or more difficult in order to experimentally manipulate
the participants’ confidence in the strategy that they used when trying to solve it.
Participants were given an alternative strategy to consider using on the second problem.
Mixed results suggested that individuals with low strategy confidence were more likely to
consider the alternative strategy and may have performed better on the second problem
vii

than high strategy confidence individuals. Limitations of the studies and
recommendations for future research are discussed.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW
When facing an important problem to be solved or decision to be made, people
often prefer to seek the help or advice of others before taking action. The traditions of
“strength in numbers” and “two heads are better than one” persist as ingrained tendencies
of human behavior and were evident very early in our evolutionary history (Caporael,
1997; Kenrick, Maner, & Li, 2005; Sedikides & Skowronski, 1997). The tendency to
affiliate in groups has also been observed in non-human primates (Packer, 1977),
suggesting a strong evolutionary drive to affiliate with others. While our more primitive
ancestors may have banded together in groups in response to external threats (Baer &
McEachron, 1982) or for other simple reasons of mere survival, modern humans continue
to believe that cooperating with others, or at least seeking their help or advice, allows us
to solve problems more effectively or more efficiently than what we could accomplish
alone. Despite this seemingly obvious motivation of human nature, the scientific research
community has questioned whether benefits of collaboration with others are absolute.
Does relying on others for assistance grant us advantages over working alone in all
situations, under all conditions? Are there disadvantages to cooperating with others, and
do these outweigh the benefits? These simple questions do not have simple answers, and
continue to inspire research scientists from a variety of disciplines that study group
behavior. The field of social psychology and its related disciplines (such as
1
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organizational behavior) offer some insights to aid in approaching this problem.
Studying group behavior requires understanding not only the group itself, but the
nature of the task or problem the group faces. Groups—both human and otherwise—
engage in a large and potentially indefinite variety of activities. Even focusing
exclusively on modern humans doesn’t do much to narrow this scope. Tasks can be
physical or mental, easy or difficult, simple or complex, requiring cooperative group
action or performed by a single individual within the group. Within psychology, one of
the best recognized systems for organizing group tasks is McGrath’s (1984) “task
circumplex,” which consists of both a two-dimensional structure and eight-category
method for classifying tasks performed by groups. The two dimensions account for (1)
the tasks involving mental/conceptual vs. physical/behavioral activity and (2) conflict vs.
cooperation of group members while performing them. The eight task categories arrayed
within these dimensions are intended to be inclusive of all group activities while also
keeping the activities mutually exclusive of each other. The labels for these categories are
as follows: planning, creativity, intellective, decision-making, cognitive conflict, mixedmotive, contests/battles/competitive, and performance/psycho-motor.
Although the model is admirable for its comprehensiveness, some theorists
highlight critical weaknesses of the underlying concepts. Larson (2010) argues that the
model still leaves considerable ambiguity in task classification unresolved, as well as
clustering tasks together that other researchers have demonstrated as having important
differences in their structures, casting doubt on how similar some tasks in the same
category actually are. He argues that the simplicity of McGrath’s categorization scheme
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distorts more fine-grained distinctions between group tasks, and thus may be of limited
utility for understanding group behavior in the context of different tasks.
Other task organization systems focus on a single, specific characteristic to
categorize tasks. One such method is the intellective—judgmental continuum (Laughlin,
1980). Anchored at one end of this continuum are tasks that have objective, demonstrably
correct answers or solutions (intellective tasks), while tasks with subjective answers that
cannot be demonstrated as objectively correct (judgmental tasks) are anchored at the
other end. One example of a task at or very near the intellective end is a mathematical
problem (e.g., 2x + 3 = 7, x = ?). Assuming that one understands the basic rules of
arithmetic and algebraic functions, it can be objectively demonstrated that x = 2 in that
equation. In contrast, an example of a judgmental task is deciding the “better” of two
pieces of artwork. While one might have a strong opinion that one is prettier or more
interesting, there is no objective method of demonstrating that this is objectively true, or
that either is “better” by these or any other means of comparison. In defining the nature
of this demonstrability concept in the context of group behavior, Laughlin & Ellis (1986)
list four criteria that must be met to consider tasks as demonstrable among group
members: (1) the group agrees on the underlying conceptual system applied to the task;
(2) the group possesses sufficient information to be able to complete the task; (3) group
members who are unable to solve the problem themselves can recognize a correct
solution if it is proposed to them; (4) group members who are able to solve the problem
themselves have sufficient ability, motivation, and time to demonstrate the correct
solution to other group members.
An understanding of task structures is incredibly important for informing
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methodological approaches to study groups (Larson, 2010). Group behavior cannot be
understood without a keen understanding of what behavior the group is engaging in, or
put another way, the task it performs. It is for this reason that I next turn to a thorough
review of the task being employed in the present study.
Letters-to-Numbers
The current study utilized a task known as letters-to-numbers, a highly intellective
(demonstrable) task notable for its featured role in group problem-solving literature (first
published by Laughlin, Bonner, & Miner, 2002). Letters-to-numbers is a cryptographic
task that involves solving a code of the numbers 0-9 randomly assigned to the letters A-J,
with no repetitions (each letter A-J represents one number 0-9). The goal is to solve the
full mapping of letters to numbers (determining which number each letter represents). In
performing the task, participants propose algebraic equations in letters and are given the
answers to those equations, also in letters. An example of an equation is “A+B-H = ?”.
The answer provided for this equation might be “A+B-H = DF” (the numerical value of
“A” plus “B” minus “H” is equal to “DF,” a 2-digit number). The task only involves the
mathematical operations of addition and subtraction; multiplication and division are not
permitted in proposed equations. Thus, multi-digit expressions such as “DF” do not imply
“D multiplied by F,” as would normally be the case in algebraic notation. “DF” is simply
representing a 2-digit number.
The task is organized as a sequence of “trials,” the nature of which has varied
throughout the short history of the task being used in experimental research studies.
However, all variations consist of the following components, in this order: participants
(1) propose an equation in letters, (2) receive an answer to that equation (provided by the

5
experimenter) also in letters, (3) make guesses about the value of the coded letters (e.g.,
A=5, B=8, etc.), and (4) receive feedback about whether or not their guesses are correct.
The task proceeds until participants either solve the full code or reach a predetermined
stopping or failure state (e.g., a limited number of trials to use to try to solve it).
Performance on the task is generally measured by the number of trials participants use to
solve for the numerical value of all letters in the code, with the goal of solving the full
code using as few trials as possible (fewer trials indicating better performance).
The letters-to-numbers task is considered to be highly intellective (demonstrable)
due to its basis in mathematical logic (Laughlin, 1980; Laughlin & Ellis, 1986) and multistep structure. Each step (trial) offers intermediate progress towards solving the full
letters-to-numbers code, and information about the code can be inferred from the
equations proposed, answers received, and guesses made. In the equation example above
(“A+B-H=DF”), a logical assumption is that D=1. Recall that the letters each represent
one number, 0-9. The largest possible value for the equation “A+B-H” would be 17 (if A
or B was equal to 9, the other letter was equal to 8, and H was equal to 0), so D cannot
possibly be greater than 1. D cannot be zero either, since it would be omitted from the
answer (e.g., if F was equal to 4, the answer would be displayed as “F” (4), not “DF”
(04)—zero is never included in the answer if it is the first digit).
Additionally, the highly logical structure of the letters-to-numbers problem lends
itself to understanding progress through the task in two cyclical stages (Larson, 2010).
The first stage, referred to here as “strategy development” for simplicity, involves
developing a strategy (a method of developing equations that can be used to obtain
information about the code). This is followed by the second stage, referred to here as
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“strategy implementation,” that involves actually using that strategy (submitting the
equation to obtain its answer). These two stages are often cyclical and can be
implemented numerous times as participants attempt to solve the code. Larson (2010)
argues that groups of participants can perform both stages simultaneously (and even
explore multiple options at each stage), with different members focusing on different
stages. Thus, groups should be more efficient than individuals performing the task, since
individuals are less adept at performing both stages simultaneously. The demonstrable
nature of the task also allows group members to demonstrate to one another the relative
value of different strategies during the strategy development stage. This is consistent with
Laughlin & Ellis’ (1986) criteria for demonstrability.
Group members being able to demonstrate their strategies to their fellow members
is critical for the group to solve the code efficiently (or at all). A variety of strategies can
be used to solve the code, but some are more efficient than others, allowing for the code
to be solved using fewer trials. Larson (2010) discusses two aspects of letters-to-numbers
strategy. One aspect of strategy is the types of equations used to obtain information about
the code. Participants can propose relatively simple equations (such as A+B) or highly
complex equations with many letters and mathematical operations. Laughlin (2011)
discusses how more complex equations—defined as using more letters in the equations—
are generally better to use to obtain information about the code, as they tend to help
identify more letters per trial used.
An example of a particularly effective strategy to use is to add all unknown letters
together. Initially this would involve adding all ten letters together on the first trial, since
none of the letters are known (A+B+C+D+E+F+G+H+I+J). Given that the ten letters
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always represent the same ten numbers (0-9) albeit in an unknown order, the answer to
this equation will always be 45 (0+1+2+3+4+5+6+7+8+9), immediately providing the
answer to two letters (the letters representing 4 and 5) without needing to know the value
of any other letter. A participant could proceed with this strategy by removing the letters
representing 4 and 5 from the equation, and adding the remaining eight unknown letters.
The answer to this equation, regardless what the letters are, will always be 36
(0+1+2+3+6+7+8+9), providing answers for another two letters (3 and 6). One could
continue with this method, submitting subsequent equations that are guaranteed to
produce 27 and 18. Such a method is objectively more efficient than simpler strategies,
such as those adding two letters. Although simpler equations can be informative in
certain circumstances (e.g., if A+B equals a two-digit answer, the first digit of the answer
must be 1, since adding two numbers cannot be greater than 17), they are not nearly as
effective as adding all of the unknown letters together, and may not be informative at all.
For example, if A+B equals a single-digit answer, this is relatively unhelpful early on in
the problem with few or no letters known, due to the number of possible combinations of
numbers that could produce this result.
A second aspect of strategy that is demonstrable is the method of making guesses
about the code, described as “hypothesis strategies” by Larson (2010). In previous
studies, one step in attempting to solve the code is proposing the value of one letter (e.g.,
A=1) and receiving feedback as to whether or not that guess is correct before guessing
the full code (all letters and all numbers). Consider the example above where an equation
“A+B” produces a 2-digit answer such as “CE,” revealing that C=1. When it comes time
to make a guess, a participant could guess C=1. However, such a guess would not
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provide any new information about the code, since this part of the code is already known.
A more efficient alternative would be to make a guess about any other letter, even a letter
not involved in the equation (e.g., H=8). There is a chance (if only a small one; a 10%
chance if no letters are known) that this single guess is correct, and reveals new
information about the code. Thus, as participants work through the code, it is more
efficient to guess about letters that they don’t know than those they do.
Although the letters-to-numbers task was used in a series of studies by Laughlin
and colleagues (Laughlin et al., 2002; Laughlin, Hatch, Silver, & Boh, 2006; Laughlin,
Zander, Knievel, & Tan, 2003), these studies will not be reviewed in detail here as the
results are only tangent to the current topic. However, the task has been useful in learning
about group problem-solving performance, yet certain aspects of it remain relatively
unexplored. What was not examined much in previous studies is the group process that
led to performance outputs. The studies cited above generally follow an input-output
method of understanding group problem-solving, with only brief insights into group
interaction processes. For example, Laughlin et al. (2006) compared performance of
individuals and groups with two, three, four, and five members. Performance and steps to
solution (equations and guesses) on the letters-to-numbers task were examined, but the
authors could only speculate as to what social processes were at work within the groups,
or why they would have performed better or worse than expected due to a number of
factors. The results demonstrated that groups—specifically those with at least three
members—outperformed groups with two members (dyads) and individuals, however it
is not clear what produced this pattern of results. Further, results suggested that groups
outperform even what their best individual members would be capable of—an extremely
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rare finding in problem-solving research, which typically supports the idea that groups
perform better than their average member would, but not better than their “best”
members, who often outperform interactive groups.
Previous studies suggest that there is something about the letters-to-numbers task
that proves advantageous to interactive problem-solving groups, and allows them to
perform the task very efficiently. One possibility offered by Larson (2010) involves
diversity of member strategies: as problem-solving groups increase in size, there is a
higher probability that the groups’ members would propose different strategies to use to
solve the letters-to-numbers code. The highly demonstrable nature of the task allows for
an individual member with a strategy idea (such as an effective type of equation to use) to
demonstrate its effectiveness to their fellow group members. The group can then debate
the merit of the strategy and choose whether or not to use it. For this reason, a key
component of understanding why groups are effective letters-to-numbers solvers may rest
in an understanding of how intragroup diversity affects group process and performance.
Diversity in Groups and Teams
As is the case with categorizing group tasks, various systems of defining and
measuring intragroup diversity are available (see Mannix & Neale, 2005, for a broad
review). Many methods utilize separate subtypes of diversity as qualitatively distinct and
impacting groups in different ways, similar to the McGrath (1984) model of group tasks.
One recent system is Carton & Cummings’ (2012) Typology of Subgroups in Work
Teams. Although the authors focus on subgroups within teams (that is, diverse groups
within a group), their criteria for measuring diversity is useful in highlighting different
varieties of diversity within a group or team, and how these different types of diversity
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may affect group process and performance, even if diversity is measured as differences
between individuals within a group.
The first type of diversity addressed by Carton & Cummings (2012) is based on
identity. Drawing heavily from social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), identity
diversity follows the logic that individuals view themselves and their group members on
the basis of social categories, such as age, gender, occupation, etc. Social identification as
a member of a social category involves a feeling of “oneness” with that category as an
actual member or symbolic prototype of that category (Ashforth & Mael, 1989). Within a
workgroup, judgments that oneself or one’s fellow group members belong to a social
category are made relatively quickly, since the criteria for doing so are often readily
apparent if one has even basic demographic knowledge and visual confirmation of their
group members’ characteristics. Carton & Cummings (2012) argue that the presence of
multiple social identities for members within a workgroup can potentially undermine the
sense of a single workgroup identity, which may breed intragroup competition in defense
of individual members’ social identities at the cost of maintaining a singular group or
team identity. This tension may impact team dynamics as the competitive drive for
maintaining self-concept counters the desire to achieve a unified team identity.
The second type of diversity considered by Carton & Cummings (2012) is based
on distribution (or ownership) of resources within the team and is set in the framework of
social dominance theory (Levin, Federico, Sidanius, & Rabinowitz, 2002). Disparate
control over finite resources or differences in authority, status, or power within a group
may cause tension between group members if such differences are perceived as unfair or
unjustified (Mannix, 1993; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999), particularly in cases where lower-
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power members are at the mercy of high-power members. However, there may also be
advantages to groups with unequal distribution of resources. Some research suggests that
if power is centralized within an individual or subgroup within a team, there can be a
marked benefit to overall efficiency and work output of the team on some tasks,
compared to groups with decentralized structures or no formal authority structure
(Bunderson & Boumgarden, 2010).
Similar divergent outcomes of diversity are also apparent in Carton & Cummings’
(2012) third type of diversity, which centers on differences in knowledge and information
processing styles. Citing early organizational systems theories (Ashby, 1958), the authors
suggest that development of subgroups with different sources of knowledge, and ways of
using that knowledge, is a natural occurrence in organizational workgroups as a
consequence of evolving demands placed on the organization. The need for specialization
prevents completely overlapping knowledge, perspectives, and practices within an
organization, and potentially even within small interacting workgroups. Put simply, it is
not practical for every person in an organization to be capable of addressing every
problem or need of their organization or even their local workgroup. This need for
specialization often manifests in the form of workgroups with members who do not have
the same knowledge, skills, or general work styles. A workgroup will likely have a single
manager, who has different responsibilities from the employees that he/she supervises,
that creates not only a power differential but the manager may also have unique skills
such as administrative knowledge. The employees may have specialized technical skills
or personal working styles that no other member of the work group possesses. Carton &
Cummings (2012) discuss several potential outcomes for these scenarios where
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workgroups consist of knowledge-diverse (or heterogeneous) vs. homogeneous
membership.
Such knowledge diversity may potentially lead to either positive or negative
outcomes. In terms of negative consequences, the main issue discussed by Carton &
Cummings (2012) is the impact of knowledge diversity on shared mental models for
group tasks. Mental models, a concept borrowed from cognitive research (Brauner, 1996;
Cannon-Bowers, Salas, & Converse, 1993; Hinsz, 1996), are mental representations of
how a system or mechanism operates (Tindale, Meisenhelder, Dykema-Engblade, &
Hogg, 2001). Groups generally function better when their members share mental models,
and have similar understandings of their task. As an example, sports teams rely on their
players understanding not only the rules of their sport, but also on the players
understanding each other’s role on the team and what everyone should do in a specific
situation. When a play is called in a football game, each player must know not only what
he should do, but should also have a sense of where his teammates will be and what
they’ll be doing. If a team does not have a shared mental model, this may impair the
team’s ability to function as a cohesive unit (such as football players on the same team
crashing into each other).
However, consequences of knowledge diversity are not wholly negative in Carton
& Cummings’ (2012) model. The authors argue that diversity in knowledge also prompts
a workgroup to consider alternative sources of knowledge beyond their personal
knowledge base. Even in seemingly productive groups, a lack of debate or disagreement
between group members may stifle innovation and ultimately inhibit the group’s ability
to perform at an optimal level. On the other hand, too much disagreement also limits the
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group’s ability to function if member’s disagreements prevent progress. Thus, the
relationship between inter-member disagreement and group performance can be
described as curvilinear—moderate disagreement that is enough to encourage thoughtful
discussion, but doesn’t prevent the group members from working together, seems to be
the ideal scenario.
Despite this logic, there is no reason to assume that groups actually behave in this
way. Like-minded group members failing to debate unpopular, but ultimately more
productive, solutions to problems the group faces is an interesting concept, but does it
actually occur “in nature”? Do real-world groups engaged in very low or very high levels
of disagreement demonstrate predicted shortcomings in process and performance?
Examples of both basic and applied research studies suggest that such outcomes do occur.
Within the group decision-making literature, a recurring finding is that groups whose
members share common knowledge or information will too heavily rely on that shared
information to aid in making a decision, even at the cost of neglecting “unshared”
information (known to one or more, but not all, group members) that might have led to a
better decision (Larson, 2010). To demonstrate this behavior, researchers commonly
utilize what is often referred to as a “hidden profile” paradigm, (Stasser & Titus, 1985).
In these studies, researchers will task a group of research participants with making a
decision as a group (such as identifying the likely suspect in a hypothetical murder
mystery), and distribute information packets among them to help make that decision
(such as the “evidence” about the murder). Unbeknownst to the participants, they receive
different information in their packets—some details are common among all or the
majority of group members (shared information), while some information is given to only
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one or a minority of members (unshared). The task is designed so that the unshared
information must be used to make the correct decision (identifying the correct suspect). If
shared information is relied on too heavily, it will lead the group to make the wrong
decision, one that is not supported by the full set of information, including the unshared
details. Results of such studies consistently demonstrate a tendency of groups to spend
more time discussing shared information, relying more heavily on shared information
when making their decision, and neglecting or disregarding the unshared information.
This effect has been demonstrated with a variety of tasks (Hollingshead, 1996; Kelly &
Karau, 1999; Larson, 2010; McLeod, Baron, Marti, & Yoon, 1997; Stasser & Stewart,
1992; Stasser, Stewart, & Wittenbaum, 1995; Stewart & Stasser, 1998; Scholten, van
Knippenberg, Nijstad, & De Dreu, 2007; Schulz-Hardt, Brodbeck, Mojzisch,
Kerscheriter, & Frey, 2006) and with different participant populations (Christensen,
Larson, Abbott, Ardolino, Franz, & Pfeiffer, 2000). This finding maps nicely onto the
theories that groups who spend too much time agreeing on what they have in common,
and not enough time disagreeing and debating, may actually perform worse as a result.
Applied researchers have found evidence of similar effects with real-world
workgroups. Franz (2012) tells the story of Jeffrey Jolton, PhD, an organizational
consultant, who studied a “team that got along too well” at a manufacturing firm. The
president of the firm was concerned that his engineering teams were not realizing their
full potential, and lacked innovative insights into production issues. Jolton conducted
assessments and interviews with the engineers, and the results demonstrated a familiar
pattern. It was apparent that the engineers not only had similar backgrounds and
knowledge, but also reported being averse to conflict, preferring to agree with colleagues
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instead of expressing opposing viewpoints and encouraging debate. Jolton implemented
an intervention plan designed to “stir up” the engineering teams, which included
appointing individuals to the roles of “devil’s advocate” (tasked with arguing against
colleagues’ ideas), “master of ceremony” (tasked with encouraging discussion from all
members), “librarian” (tasked with finding novel innovations and techniques outside the
engineers’ experience) and “judge” (tasked with monitoring the behaviors of those
assigned to other roles to ensure active input). Within a few weeks, teams reported better
energy and more positive team dynamics, and the business successfully grew. It would
seem that “getting along too well” potentially inhibits teams in a variety of contexts.
Carton & Cummings (2012) argue that for groups to take full advantage of
knowledge diversity, they must balance the two potential outcomes stemming from this
form of diversity: considering alternative sources of knowledge, but also finding common
ground to synthesize that knowledge. Too much emphasis on either leads to suboptimal
group performance. If the focus is on considering alternative sources of knowledge, this
may prevent a shared mental model from emerging. Alternatively, a group too focused on
developing and adhering to a shared mental model may discourage consideration of
alternative sources of knowledge. One such source of knowledge that may affect groups
is advice or counsel from someone outside the group. The extent to which groups and
individuals consider such advice has been investigated in recent research studies, and is
discussed in the next section.
Advice-Taking by Groups
The degree to which groups will consider alternative perspectives before making
a consensus decision dates back to at least Janis’ (1982) groupthink theory. A component
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of this theory is that groups often fail to consider information or “advice” from sources
outside the group when making a decision. This notion largely evaded empirical scrutiny
until very recently. Minson & Mueller (2012) demonstrated that groups (dyads), relative
to individuals, have a tendency to underutilize advice when making a judgment. In their
study, both dyads and individual participants were asked a series of general knowledge
questions (e.g., What percentage of Americans own pets?). After making initial estimates,
participants were given the opportunity to view estimates of the same quantities as given
by a previous participant in the study, and could consider that information before
rendering a final judgment (with the opportunity to change their own answer if they so
desired). Dyadic teams were significantly less influenced by these previous participants’
answers then were individuals. This behavior appeared to inhibit performance, since
estimates would have been more accurate if dyads had given the previous participants’
answers more weight when making their final judgments. Simple probability dictates that
this should be the case—when forming such judgments, an average of several
individuals’ judgments will likely be more accurate than any individual’s judgment.
These results, along with previous findings, suggest that both individuals and groups are
likely to benefit when considering outside advice.
The authors attributed this effect to groups’ higher levels of confidence in their
ability to make accurate judgments. Working with others has been shown to promote
higher confidence in one’s decision-making ability (Forsyth, 1999; Park & Hinsz, 2006),
as well as a reduced willingness to consider advice from others outside the group relative
to individuals (Gino & Moore, 2007; Harvey & Fischer, 1997; Soll & Larrick, 2009). The
finding that groups may underutilize information presented from outside the group to an
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even greater extent than individuals—even if that information is useful—is troubling
given that most people assume groups are generally better than individuals at making
important decisions (Kerr & Tindale, 2004; Larson, 2010). While groups may outperform
individuals in many contexts (Tindale, Kameda, & Hinsz, 2003), they are not universally
superior and are prone to specific flaws in information processing, such as a failure to
take advice as suggested by Janis (1982).
In considering the implications of the Minson & Mueller (2012) findings, it is
important to take note of exactly when outside information (advice) was made available
for groups to consider. In that study, groups had access to outside advice only after they
had reached consensus. This is a critical feature given the importance of consensus as a
part of the group interaction process. Reaching consensus significantly increases
members’ confidence in their group’s performance (Tindale, 1989). In short, the very
existence of consensus may render the group particularly reluctant to consider outside
advice. One potential reason for this effect is that the group members reached a state of
cognitive closure, which refers to the inclination for individuals to seek a sense of
confirmation once they have made a decision, and a subsequent reluctance to accept
ambiguity regarding the accuracy or merit of that decision (Kruglanski, 1990, 2004;
Kruglanski, Dechesne, Orehek, & Pierro, 2009; Kruglanski & Fishman, 2009; Kruglanski
& Webster, 1996). Two underlying tendencies are thought to promote this process. The
first, a tendency for urgency, involves a desire to “seize” a definitive decision as quickly
as possible. The second, a tendency for permanence, seeks to maintain this definitive
state (“freezing” on knowledge already obtained or decisions already made). In the
context of consulting outside advice when making a decision, groups may adopt their
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initial consensus judgments rapidly, followed by an aversion to any advice offered after
that decision has been made because the advice threatens the permanence of the initial
decision.
Reaching a state of cognitive closure may explain why such groups would be
reluctant to utilize any information presented from an outside source. But what of groups
that have not reached consensus—is there an opportunity to introduce outside
information before the members “close” their minds? A study conducted by Greitemeyer
& Schulz-Hardt (2003) found evidence that such an opportunity might occur during
group discussions. The authors found that when a decision-making group is offered
decision-relevant information to consider before members commit to an initial opinion,
the members are better able to recall the information and more likely to notice
inconsistencies in information available to different group members. This inconsistency
serves as a cue that the information available to any single member may be flawed, and
that the combination of members’ information may reveal an optimal decision outcome
that could only be reached through such a combination (but not by means of any one
members’ information). In short, there may be specific moments within the group’s
decision process during which outside information is more likely to be attended to by the
group.
This idea was tested in a recent study by Bihary, Larson, & Tindale (2015), who
investigated whether making outside advice available to a group before the group reached
a consensus decision would increase the chances that the advice would be considered or
used. Dyads and individuals were tasked with making quantity estimation judgments as
answers to general knowledge questions. After making an initial set of judgments,
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participants received advice in the form of a previous participant’s answers to the same
questions. The participants then had an opportunity to revise their initial judgments if
they wished. Three between-subjects conditions had participants make judgments either
in 2-person groups for both sets of judgments, as individuals for both sets of judgments,
or individually for the first set and as a dyad for the second set. Additionally, the third
condition was later median-split into two conditions based on differences (large vs.
small) between dyad members’ initial judgments. It was predicted that dyads with larger
differences (higher diversity) between members’ initial judgments would be more likely
to utilize outside advice, relative to dyads with smaller differences (lower diversity)
between members’ initial judgments. Results supported this prediction; high-diversity
dyads were significantly more likely to consider the outside advice. Members’ confidence
in their group’s ability to perform was measured as a potential mediator of this effect, but
no support for this hypothesis was found.
Current Studies
The current studies attempted to extend these results and expand upon the
previously observed effects of diversity on group process and performance. Particular
interest is on the extent to which relatively heterogeneous groups (dyads whose members
have different perspectives) will consider and use advice presented from outside the
group when performing a task collectively, compared to relatively homogeneous groups
(dyads whose members have the same or very similar perspectives). It was predicted that
the heterogeneous groups would be more likely to consider and use advice from outside
the group that offers an alternative perspective. Building from Carton & Cummings’
(2012) category of knowledge diversity, the current studies examined how diversity in
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problem-solving strategies would affect group problem-solving performance. Other
relevant factors, such as confidence in one’s abilities or performance, were also examined
in the interest of advancing our understanding of both group performance and group
interaction processes.
Most studies on diversity, particularly those in applied organizational settings,
rely on pre-existing states of diversity. One advantage of the current experimental
approach is that the diversity factor of interest (problem-solving strategies) could be
experimentally manipulated in a controlled fashion. Letters-to-numbers is a highly
customizable, computerized task. This allows for incredible flexibility in modifying the
task as needed. Specific to this study, it allowed for direct manipulation of strategy
diversity. When participants submit an algebraic equation to the program in order to get
information about the code, they may have a reason for selecting a certain equation to
use. A participant’s method of selecting equations can be directly manipulated the same
way a training program might train an employee to perform a work task in a specific way.
Participants can thus be “trained” to perform the letters-to-numbers task in a specific
way, and then paired with a teammate who was trained to use either a similar or different
approach. Further, the program can be manipulated to ensure that a participant’s strategy
training leads them to solve the problem with reasonable (though suboptimal)
effectiveness, and the program can require that the participants adhere to their given
strategies.
Additionally, the use of the letters-to-numbers task in the present design allowed
for multiple measures of group process and performance. The program tracks the entire
solution (or attempted solution) method, including equations proposed and guesses made
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about the code. Drawing from previous studies using the task, performance on the task
can be measured by the number of trials used to solve the code, the complexity of
equations proposed (with more complex equations suggesting heightened motivation to
process the more complex information), the guessing strategy (whether guesses are
merely confirming part of the code that participants should already know, or used to
explore unknown parts of the code), and the efficiency of progress toward solving the
code.
The demonstrable nature of the task was also hypothesized to encourage higher
levels of group interaction than what might be observed in tasks that are less
demonstrable. Certain predictions depended on observational measures of group
interaction to advance our understanding of group processes.

CHAPTER TWO
STUDY 1
Study 1 investigated the role of diversity in group problem-solving process on a
group’s willingness to consider outside advice when trying to solve a letters-to-numbers
problem. Participants attempted to solve two letters-to-numbers problems. For the first
problem, individual participants were given one of two simple strategies (methods of
creating input equations) to use, and were required to follow their given strategy to solve
the letters-to-numbers code. For the second problem, participants were given a more
complex, but potentially more effective, strategy to consider. They then attempted to
solve the second code paired with a teammate. In contrast with the first problem, the team
was not restricted to using any specific strategy on this second problem. Participants were
randomly assigned to either a Same- or a Diverse-strategy condition, so that dyad
members’ first strategy either matched their partner’s or was different. The letters-tonumbers program was designed to make all participants’ given strategies seem effective
for solving the problem (described further in the Method section below). All sessions
were video-recorded to allow for subsequent analysis of group behaviors. The following
predictions were tested:
Hypothesis 1: Diverse-strategy dyads will outperform Same-strategy dyads on the
letters-to-numbers task. Better performance was defined as solving more letters per
trial used, and using fewer trials to solve the full code.
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Hypothesis 2: Diverse-strategy dyads will demonstrate superior letters-tonumbers information processing than Same-strategy dyads. Superior information
processing was defined as proposing more complex equations (Hypothesis 2A) and more
exploratory (vs. confirmatory) guesses (Hypothesis 2B).
Hypothesis 3: Diverse-strategy dyads will be more likely to use outside advice
(i.e., use the more complex but potentially more efficient Add All Unknown strategy),
than Same-strategy dyads.
Hypothesis 4: The tendency to use the more complex Add All Unknown strategy
will mediate the relationship between strategy diversity condition and letters-to-numbers
performance, with Diverse-strategy dyads being more likely to use the Add All Unknown
strategy.
Hypothesis 5: Diverse-strategy dyads will self-report more productive discussions
(Hypothesis 5A) and better perceived performance (Hypothesis 5B) than Same-strategy
dyads on post-session questionnaires.
Hypothesis 6: Diverse-strategy dyads will be rated by observers as having more
productive discussions than Same-strategy dyads.
Study 1 Method
Participants
One hundred thirty-two participants were recruited for Study 1. A power analysis,
based on results of previous studies conducted by the investigator, suggested that this
number should be sufficient to produce reasonably reliable results (80% power) with a
small to moderate effect size. Undergraduate students from introductory psychology
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classes were recruited for the study. Participants were randomly assigned to one of three
strategy diversity conditions, and attempted to solve two letters-to-numbers problems
(described below). Participant assignment was equal across conditions, with 44
participants (22 dyads) in each condition. For their participation, students earned credits
toward fulfilling a research participation course requirement. Participants also had the
opportunity to enter a raffle to win a prize.
Experimental Task
Participants performed two separate letters-to-numbers problems (Laughlin, 2011;
Laughlin et al., 2002; Laughlin et al., 2003; Laughlin et al., 2006) that were presented via
computer. For each problem, the numbers 0-9 were randomly coded as the letters A-J
with no repetitions (each letter represented a unique number). The participants’ goal was
to figure out which number each letter represented, and to accomplish this using as few
“trials” as possible. To get hints about the code, participants submitted algebraic
equations to the program using the letters A-J and the mathematical operations of
addition and subtraction (e.g., A+B=?). The program provided answers to the equation
entered (e.g., A+B=CJ). After receiving the answer to their equations, participants then
had the opportunity to guess at the number value of one letter (e.g., C=1), and were
informed whether or not this guess was correct. Participants then proposed a mapping for
the full code (all letters and all numbers), and were told whether the full code was correct
or not in its entirety. One trial consisted of these six steps (proposing an equation,
receiving an answer to that equation, making a guess about one letter, receiving feedback
about that guess, proposing a full code mapping, and receiving feedback about the full
code), and participants continued through a series of trials until they either solved the full
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code, exceeded the trial limit (20), or exceeded the time limit (15 minutes), at which point
the program terminated.
Experimental Conditions
In order to experimentally manipulate diversity of equation strategies on the first
letters-to-numbers problem, participants were assigned to one of three strategy diversity
conditions. Similar to earlier letters-to-numbers studies (Laughlin et al., 2003),
participants were forced to use a specific strategy to create equations. One strategy
(referred to here as the “Add Two” strategy) involved constructing equations that added
two letters (e.g., A+B, E+E). A second strategy (referred to as “Use Three”) involved
using equations consisting of three letters and either one or two types of mathematical
operations (either addition or subtraction or both). This second strategy allows for a
larger variety of equations (e.g., A+A+A, A+D+F, C-D+J, D-B-G, BD+F, C-HJ)
compared to the first. These two strategies were selected because, while they are
different, previous research suggests that participants using equations with either two or
three letters do not differ in their overall performance on letters-to-numbers tasks
(Laughlin et al., 2003).
Since participants were obligated to use their assigned strategy, an additional
feature of the letters-to-numbers program was implemented to suggest that a participant’s
strategy was useful and helpful. Participants were told that the letters-to-numbers code
was randomly generated. While this was true for the second problem, it was only partially
true for the first problem. In truth, there was no set code for the first problem until
participants submitted their first equation to the program. When this first equation was
entered, the program deliberately assigned values to the letters used in the equation so
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that the answer was always a two-digit number, and then assigned remaining numbers to
the rest of the letters at random. For example, if a participant submitted the equation
“A+B=?” the program could fix the value of A to 9 and B to 8, producing an answer of
17, and randomly assign the numbers 0-7 to the remaining letters. The intent of this
feature was to make it easier for participants to solve the code then if, for example, A+B
was equal to a single-digit answer. Two-digit answers produced from the two equation
strategies were limited to including only 1 or 2 as the first digit of the answer, although
other possibilities may have been evident from the participant’s point of view for
participants assigned to use the Use Three strategy (e.g., AB+C could represent 86+5,
producing an answer of 91). However, equations of this style (a single-digit number
added to or subtracted from a two-digit number, versus some combination of three onedigit numbers) were rare; only about 6% of participants assigned to use the Use Three
strategy used such equations on the first trial of the first problem. Conducting analyses
with these cases removed did not alter the results.
Each experimental session included two participants, who first individually
attempted to solve one letters-to-numbers problem using one of the strategies described
above. The three experimental conditions included two conditions in which participants
were instructed to use the same strategy (Add Two or Use Three) and one condition in
which one participant was instructed to use the Add Two strategy, while the other was
instructed to use the Use Three strategy. The letters-to-numbers program restricted the
equations that could be entered, so that if a participant attempted to submit an equation
that didn’t match his/her assigned strategy, the program rejected it and asked for a
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different equation. Participants were not informed of each other’s given strategies, nor
whether they were given the same or different strategies.
Procedure
Participants were escorted from the participant waiting area to the laboratory
room by the experimenter. Each session included two participants in the same room,
working at computers on different sides of a large table. Upon arrival, the experimenter
provided an overview of the experimental session as part of the informed consent
process. The overview included a brief explanation that participants would be working on
computers to complete a “code-breaking” task. Participants were not expressly told that
they would be working together as a team, or other details of experimental procedures, to
avoid suspicions of the purpose of the study. They were also notified that the session
would be video-recorded, with the camera identified by the experimenter in plain sight on
a shelf in the room. The experimenter explained that research participation credits and a
chance to enter a raffle were offered as compensation for participating. After the
explanation, the experimenter answered any questions participants had, and asked them
to sign the informed consent document.
Participants were next introduced to the letters-to-numbers program. An
introduction screen briefly described the basic structure and goal of the task. After giving
participants a minute to read this screen, the experimenter asked if participants
understood the description and if they had any questions about the task at this point.
Participants next completed a short tutorial that walked them through a few trials of a
letters-to-numbers problem, step-by-step, and explained relevant features of the program
along the way. This tutorial was expected to take 5-10 minutes to complete, and
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participants were asked to inform the experimenter when they had finished. Since the two
participants in the session may have finished the tutorial at different times, the first one to
finish was asked to wait until the other participant had finished.
Once both participants finished the tutorial, the experimenter reviewed the basic
goal of the task, and emphasized that the participants’ goal was to solve the code in as
few trials as possible, or at least try to figure out as much of the code as possible (to allow
for participants who may not solve the full code). Participants could again ask any
questions that they had regarding the task or the letters-to-numbers computer program.
After questions were answered, the experimenter introduced the equation strategy
manipulation described earlier. The strategies were presented as aids to assist participants
in solving the letters-to-numbers code. Participants were told that the program would
require them to follow the strategy for the first problem, but that they would attempt to
solve a second problem later that did not have this restriction. Strategies were provided
on paper sheets distributed to each participant (to prevent participants from knowing each
other’s strategy), with a brief description of the strategy and several examples of
equations that fit that strategy (see Appendices A and B). The experimenter placed a
divider on the table so that participants could not see each other, and instructed them to
begin the first problem. When finished, a participant would notify the experimenter and
wait for the other participant to finish the task.
After solving the first problem (or reaching either the time or trial limit and thus
failing to solve it), participants completed a short questionnaire (see Appendix D) that
asked for their perceptions of their performance on the first letters-to-numbers problem.
Questions asked about perceived difficulty of the task and asked participants to rate their
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performance in relation to other students who might participate in the experiment. This
was used as a measure of confidence in their problem-solving abilities.
After completing the questionnaire, the two participants in the session were
teamed up (as a dyad) to attempt to solve a second letters-to-numbers problem as a team
working on one computer. Deciding logistics of the team’s setup (which participant’s
computer would be used, which side of the table they would sit on, etc.) was left up to
participants. They were given a third equation strategy (on a paper sheet, similar to
strategies for the first problem, see Appendix C) to consider to use for solving this second
problem, however, unlike the first problem they were not forced to use it. Participants
were told that they could consider this strategy alongside the strategies they used for the
first problem, and could decide with their partner how they should ultimately work
through the problem and which strategies (if any) they should use. They were able to
switch strategies or freely abandon a strategy at any time. The third strategy, referred to
here as the “Add All Unknown” strategy, involves adding all of the unknown letters
together. This strategy can be particularly effective if used correctly. When all letters are
unknown, adding all letters A-J in one equation (A+B+C+D+E+F+G+H+I+J=?) always
produces an answer of 45, providing the letter codes for both 4 and 5. This can be
followed with a second equation adding all of the letters except for those that equal 4 and
5, producing 36 and two more letter solutions, and so on with subsequent equations
producing answers of 27 and 18. Clever guesses will reveal the letters representing the
remaining digits (0 and 9) during these trials, allowing the code to be solved in four trials
using this strategy. Participants had the same goal of solving the code in as few trials as
possible, or at least solving as much of the code as possible. The experimenter
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encouraged participants to discuss their strategies used for the first problem, their
performance on the first problem, and the Add All Unknown strategy. However,
participants were asked to begin the second problem (initiating the letters-to-numbers
program and starting the 15-minute countdown) before beginning discussion, to avoid
variations in the amount of time teams discuss before starting the second problem. A
raffle prize (one of three $50 gift cards) was also offered as a performance incentive—
participants all began with 20 “tickets” to enter the raffle, and lost a ticket for each trial
they used to work through the problem.
When participants solved the second problem (or ran out of trials or time), they
each individually completed a second set of questionnaire measures that included
questions about perceived performance similar to the first questionnaire (but addressing
the team’s performance) as well as questions regarding the team’s general social
behaviors. Participants were unable to view their teammate’s answers or to discuss the
questionnaire with their teammate.
After both participants completed the second questionnaire, the experimenter
verified whether participants wanted to be entered into the raffle or not. For those that
did, the experimenter noted the number of raffle tickets participants earned, based on
their team’s performance on the second problem. Physical raffle tickets were marked
with participant ID codes and placed in a container. Raffle winners were selected at the
end of the semester, and contacted via email. Prior to selecting winners, any betweenconditions differences in performance were balanced so as not to favor participants in any
one condition. That is, after determining the average number of raffle tickets earned by
participants in each condition, all conditions scoring lower than the best condition had
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extra tickets added to even out the between-conditions averages. Lastly, the experimenter
informed participants that their research credits would be posted within the next day, and
that a debriefing email would be sent out to all participants at the end of the semester.
Participants were then thanked and dismissed.
Measures
Letters-to-Numbers Information Processing
In order to assess participants’ methods of working through the problem, two
measures of letters-to-numbers problem-solving processing were used. The first, equation
complexity, is measured as the average number of letters used in equations. More
complex equations (using more letters) are considered to be demonstrably superior to
simpler equations since they potentially reveal more information about the code
(Laughlin, 2011). The second measure of letters-to-numbers process is guessing strategy.
When participants make guesses about the number assigned to a single letter (e.g., A=2),
these guesses can be either confirming something participants should already know
(confirmatory) or be a guess about part of the code that they could not yet know
(exploratory). For example, if a participant were to submit the equation “A+B=?” and the
program provided the answer “A”, it is clear that B=0 and A is some other number.
Guessing “B=0” would be a confirmatory guess, while guessing at the value of A would
an exploratory guess (assuming the guess is not “A=0”). Exploratory guesses are more
likely to reveal new information about the code (Larson, 2010), and are thus more
efficient than confirmatory guesses.
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Letters-to-Numbers Performance
Letters-to-numbers performance has traditionally been measured by trials-tosolution (the number of trials participant used to solve the full code), with fewer trials-tosolution indicating better (more efficient) performance (Laughlin, 2011; Laughlin et al.,
2002; Laughlin et al., 2003; Laughlin et al., 2006). However, using trials-to-solution as a
measure of performance assumes that all participants successfully solve the code. This is
not always the case, as participants may reach one of two failure states (reaching either
the time limit or maximum number of allowed trials) without solving the code. Although
this was accounted for in earlier studies by assigning failures-to-solve a score of
maximum number of trials + 1, this method potentially distorts the measure, particularly
if many participants fail to solve the code. For example, in a study that allowed
participants a maximum of 10 trials, participants who failed to solve received a score of
11 trials, regardless of how much of the code they had solved. Thus, participants who
performed differently (in terms of how much of the code they had solved) could receive
the same score, artificially reducing the variance in the measure.
Thus, an additional performance measure was also used. It is the average number
of letters solved per trial used, calculated by dividing the total number of letters solved
correctly by the number of trials used. This measure, used in some but not all previous
letters-to-numbers studies (Laughlin, 2011; Laughlin et al., 2002) avoids the distortion
potentially introduced by the simpler trials-to-solution approach, and accounts for the full
range of possible performance scores. Authors of previous letters-to-numbers studies did
not specifically report the number of participants in their studies who failed to solve the
problems, nor did they specify if a time limit was imposed that may have impacted
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performance. If only a small number of participants—relatively even across conditions—
fail to solve the letters-to-numbers problems, it may be possible to drop their data from
the analysis and proceed with the trials-to-solution measure. However, due to concerns
that this method also distorts or misrepresents results, the letters-per-trial measure may
need to be used as the performance measure. Due to a number of participants in multiple
conditions failing to solve the code (discussed under results for Hypothesis 1), this
alternative measure is used in analyses.
Confidence
Confidence was measured via the self-report questionnaire (see Appendices D and
E), with questionnaires administered to individual participants after finishing each lettersto-numbers problem. Participants were asked to rate their confidence in having performed
the task better than 25%, 50%, and 75% of other participants (compared to other
individuals after the first problem, teams after the second) in the study. Initial analyses
used the “better than 50%” item for measuring confidence, however alternative measures
(such as combining the three confidence items into a single measure, or substituting the
“better than 25%” or “better than 75%” alternative measures) were also explored.
Team Dynamics
The interaction between team members was measured using both self-report and
observational methods. For self-report measures, participants completed a questionnaire
after finishing the second task (see Appendix E). The questionnaire included items
addressing perceptions of social dynamics such as degree of conflict vs. cooperation
within the team, leadership, and perceptions of how much (if at all) discussions benefitted
the team. Sessions were also video-recorded to allow for coding of behavioral evidence
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of these constructs, including frequency counts of observed behaviors and scale ratings of
team interactions (see Appendix G), by an observational analyst who was blind to
hypotheses. Elements of this coding scheme were tested for reliability in a pilot study.
Matched subsets of the coding data recorded independently by the principal investigator
and a research assistant correlated strongly (r = .80 or higher) and consistently across
behavior categories, suggesting high reliability for the coding scheme.
Study 1 Results
Hypothesis 1
I predicted that Diverse-strategy dyads would outperform Same-strategy dyads
(both Add Two and Use Three conditions) on the letters-to-numbers task. Many
participants failed to solve one or both letters-to-numbers problems. 70% of participants
failed to solve the first problem individually, and approximately 14% of groups failed to
solve the second problem. Due to these failures to solve one or both letters-to-numbers
problems, the average number of letters solved per trials used was used to measure
performance (instead of total trials used to solve the full code, as in previous studies
utilizing the letters-to-numbers task). The analysis used to test Hypothesis 1 was a 2
(Letters-to-numbers problem: First, Second) x 3 (Strategy diversity condition: Samestrategy/Add-Two, Same-strategy/Use-Three, Diverse-strategy) mixed-model analysis of
variance (ANOVA) on participants’ letters-to-numbers performance, with problem
number as a within-subjects factor and strategy diversity condition as a between-subjects
factor. The within-subjects factor was comprised of two levels: (1) the average of the two
team members’ performance on the first problem and (2) the team’s measure from the
second problem. The main effect of letters-to-numbers problem was significant, F (1, 63)

= 119.07, p < .001, partial η = .65. This suggests that participants’ performance on the
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second letters-to-numbers problem (M = 1.39, SD = .51) was significantly better than
their performance on the first problem (M = .69, SD = .35). The main effect of strategy
diversity condition was not significant, F (2, 63) = .10, p = .902, partial η2 = .00. This
suggests that participants’ performance did not differ between participants in the Diversestrategy (M = 1.03, SD = .40), Same-strategy/Add-Two (M = 1.07, SD = .41), and Samestrategy/Use-Three (M = 1.03, SD = .47) conditions. The interaction between letters-tonumbers problem and strategy diversity condition was also not significant, F (2, 63) =
1.87, p = .162, partial η2 = .06, suggesting that the relationship between strategy diversity
condition and performance did not differ between the two letters-to-numbers problems. A
planned contrast revealed that there was no difference in performance between Diversestrategy groups and groups in the two Same-strategy conditions, t (63) = .00, p = .432
(one-tailed), r = .02.
Two additional exploratory analyses were conducted. An additional mixed-model
ANOVA was conducted, replacing the average of two members’ performance on the first
problem with the better individual’s performance score on the first problem in the withinsubjects factor. The main effect of letters-to-numbers problem was significant, F (1, 63) =
28.60, p < .001, partial η2 = .31. This suggests that participants’ performance on the
second letters-to-numbers problem (M = 1.39, SD = .51) was significantly better than
their performance on the first problem (M = 1.00, SD = .52). The main effect of strategy
diversity condition was not significant, F (2, 63) = .06, p = .944, partial η2 = .00. This
suggests that participants’ performance did not differ between participants in the Diversestrategy (M = 1.18, SD = .49), Same-strategy/Add-Two (M = 1.22, SD = .48), and Same-
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strategy/Use-Three (M = 1.20, SD = .57) conditions. The interaction between letters-tonumbers problem and strategy diversity condition was also not significant, F (2, 63) =
1.94, p = .152, partial η2 = .06, suggesting that the relationship between strategy diversity
condition and performance did not differ between the two letters-to-numbers problems. A
planned contrast revealed that there was no difference in performance between Diversestrategy groups and groups in the two Same-strategy conditions, t (63) = .00, p = .394
(one-tailed), r = .03.
Finally, Hypothesis 1 was also tested with a one-way ANOVA, with performance
on the second letters-to-numbers problem as the dependent measure and strategy
diversity condition as the between-subjects factor. The effect of strategy diversity
condition on performance was not significant, F (2, 63) = .57, p = .568, partial η2 = .02.
This suggests that performance on the second letters-to-numbers problem did not differ
between participants in the Diverse-strategy (M = 1.46, SD = .46), Same-strategy/AddTwo (M = 1.42, SD = .50), and Same-strategy/Use-Three (M = 1.30, SD = .56)
conditions. A planned contrast revealed that there was no difference in performance
between Diverse-strategy groups and groups in the two Same-strategy conditions, t (63) =
.75, p = .229 (one-tailed), r = .09. Thus, Hypothesis 1 was not supported.
Hypothesis 2
I predicted that Diverse-strategy dyads would demonstrate superior letters-tonumbers information processing than Same-strategy dyads. Improved information
processing is conceptualized as proposing more complex equations using more letters
(Hypothesis 2A) and more exploratory (vs. confirmatory) guesses (Hypothesis 2B). I
tested for differences in equation complexity in the second letters-to-numbers problem
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with a one-way ANOVA, with strategy diversity condition as the between-subjects
factor. The effect of strategy diversity condition on equation complexity was not
significant, F (2, 63) = 1.37, p = .261, partial η2 = .04. This suggests that participants’
equation complexity did not differ between participants in the Diverse-strategy (M =
3.36, SD = 1.81), Same-strategy/Add-Two (M = 2.68, SD = 1.08), and Samestrategy/Use-Three (M = 3.03, SD = 1.06) conditions. A planned contrast provided
marginal evidence that Diverse-strategy groups may have used more complex equations
than groups in both Same-strategy conditions, t (63) = 1.42, p = .08 (one-tailed), r = .18.
Thus, Hypothesis 2A was only weakly supported by the marginal results of the planned
contrast.
Hypothesis 2B was tested with a 2 (Letters-to-numbers problem: First, Second) x
3 (Strategy diversity condition: Same-strategy/Add-Two, Same-strategy/Use-Three,
Diverse-strategy) mixed-model ANOVA, with letters-to-numbers problem as a withinsubjects factor and strategy diversity condition as the between-subjects factor. The
within-subjects factor was comprised of 2 levels: (1) the average of the two team
members’ proportion of total guesses that were exploratory on the first problem and (2)
the team’s proportion of total guesses that were exploratory on the second problem. The
main effect of letters-to-numbers problem was significant, F (1, 63) = 32.14, p < .001,
partial η2 = .34. Somewhat unexpectedly, this suggests that participants proposed more
exploratory guesses on the first letters-to-numbers problem (M = .68, SD = .18) than they
did on the second problem (M = .47, SD = .28). The main effect of strategy diversity
condition was not significant, F (2, 63) = 2.08, p = .133, partial η2 = .06. This would
suggest that participants’ guessing strategy did not differ between participants in the
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Diverse-strategy (M = .64, SD = .21), Same-strategy/Add-Two (M = .57, SD = .21), and
Same-strategy/Use-Three (M = .53, SD = .27) conditions. The interaction between lettersto-numbers problem and strategy diversity condition was also not significant, F (2, 63) =
.28, p = .759, partial η2 = .01, suggesting that the relationship between strategy diversity
condition and guessing strategy did not differ between letters-to-numbers problems.
Nevertheless, a planned contrast suggested that Diverse-strategy groups proposed more
exploratory guesses than groups in both Same-strategy conditions, t (63) = 11.62, p < .05
(one-tailed), r = .23.
Two additional exploratory analyses were conducted to test Hypothesis 2B. An
additional mixed-model ANOVA was conducted, replacing the average of the two team
members’ proportion of total guesses that were exploratory on the first problem with the
better individual’s proportion of guesses that were exploratory in the within-subjects
factor. The main effect of letters-to-numbers problem was significant, F (1, 63) = 84.01,
p < .001, partial η2 = .57. Again, this unexpected result suggests that participants
proposed more exploratory guesses on the first letters-to-numbers problem (M = .82, SD
= .17) than they did on the second problem (M = .47, SD = .28). The main effect of
strategy diversity condition was not significant, F (2, 63) = 2.10, p = .131, partial η2 =
.06. This suggests that participants’ guessing strategy did not differ between participants
in the Diverse-strategy (M = .71, SD = .21), Same-strategy/Add-Two (M = .63, SD = .21),
and Same-strategy/Use-Three (M = .61, SD = .25) conditions. The interaction between
letters-to-numbers problem and strategy diversity condition was also not significant, F (2,
63) = .84, p = .436, partial η2 = .03, suggesting that the relationship between strategy
diversity condition and guessing strategy did not differ between letters-to-numbers
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problems. However, a planned contrast suggested that Diverse-strategy groups proposed
more exploratory guesses than groups in both Same-strategy conditions, t (63) = 16.56, p
< .05 (one-tailed), r = .23.
Finally, Hypothesis 2B was also tested with a one-way ANOVA, with proportion
of guesses that were exploratory on the second letters-to-numbers problem as the
dependent measure and strategy diversity condition as the between-subjects factor. The
effect of strategy diversity condition on guessing strategy was not significant, F (2, 63) =
1.37, p = .261, partial η2 = .04. This suggests that guessing strategy on the second lettersto-numbers problem did not differ between participants in the Diverse-strategy (M = .54,
SD = .29), Same-strategy/Add-Two (M = .48, SD = .23), and Same-strategy/Use-Three
(M = .40, SD = .30) conditions. However, a planned contrast provided marginal evidence
that Diverse-strategy groups may have made more exploratory guesses than groups in the
two Same-strategy conditions, t (63) = 1.37, p = .08 (one-tailed), r = .03. Thus,
Hypothesis 2B was partially supported by the planned contrasts analyses. Participants
proposing more exploratory guesses on the first letters-to-numbers problem overall was
unexpected.
Hypothesis 3
I predicted that Diverse-strategy dyads would be more likely to use outside advice
(in the form of the more complex but potentially more efficient Add All Unknown
strategy) on the second problem than Same-strategy dyads. The tendency to use this more
complex strategy was measured as the proportion of trials on which the strategy was
used. This hypothesis was tested with a one-way ANOVA, with strategy diversity
condition as the between-subjects factor. The effect of strategy diversity condition on the
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use of the Add All Unknown strategy was not significant, F (2, 63) = .06, p = .947,
partial η2 = .00. This suggests that participants’ tendency to use this strategy did not differ
between participants in the Diverse-strategy (M = .10, SD = .16), Same-strategy/AddTwo (M = .08, SD = .15), and Same-strategy/Use-Three (M = .08, SD = .15) conditions.
A planned contrast revealed that there was no difference in the tendency to use this
strategy between the Diverse-strategy groups and groups in the two Same-strategy
conditions, t (63) = .32, p = .377 (one-tailed), r = .04. Since the result was not significant,
no further analyses examining moderators or mediators of this effect were conducted.
An additional exploratory analysis was conducted to test Hypothesis 3. Since
some participant groups did not use the Add All Unknown strategy at all, and those that
did used it only a small number of times, a Pearson’s chi-square analysis was conducted,
with the tendency to use the Add All Unknown strategy treated as a categorical variable
with two levels (participants did or did not use it) and strategy diversity condition
maintained as a categorical variable with three levels. Cell frequencies are provided in
Table 1. There was not a significant association between strategy diversity condition and
whether or not participants used the Add All Unknown strategy, χ2 (2) = .13, p = .935,
providing additional evidence that there was no difference between strategy diversity
conditions in their tendency to use the strategy. Thus, Hypothesis 3 was not supported.
Table 1. Chi-square cell frequencies for Hypothesis 3.
Did not use Add All
Condition
Unknown
Same-strategy/Add-Two
15
Same-strategy/Use-Three
14
Diverse-strategy
14

Used Add All Unknown
7
8
8
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Hypothesis 4
I predicted that the tendency to use the more complex Add All Unknown strategy
would mediate the relationship between strategy diversity condition and letters-tonumbers performance. The mediation analysis would have been tested with a path
analysis approach and followed steps discussed by Baron & Kenny (1986).
Unfortunately, the preliminary conditions necessary to test mediation (testing correlations
between variables in the model) were not met. In order to test the prediction that the
tendency to use the Add All Unknown strategy mediates the relationship between
strategy diversity condition and performance, three preliminary conditions must hold: 1)
strategy diversity condition and performance are correlated, 2) strategy diversity
condition and the tendency to use the Add All Unknown strategy are correlated, 3) the
tendency to use the Add All Unknown strategy and performance are correlated, while
controlling for the relationship between strategy diversity condition and performance.
The correlation matrix used to test these steps is presented in Table 2. As can be seen
from the data, the necessary correlational relationships between variables are not present,
and resulted in non-significant path coefficients in the preliminary mediation analyses.
Thus, the mediation model predicted by Hypothesis 4 was not supported.
Table 2. Correlations between variables for all participants used to test mediation model
for Hypothesis 4. Right-hand column provides standard deviations for all variables. None
of the correlation values are statistically significant.
Strategy Diversity
Condition
Strategy Diversity
Condition
Proportion of Trials
used Add All
Unknown
Performance

Proportion of Trials
used Add All
Unknown

SD
.823

.041
.033

.152
.011

.506
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Hypothesis 5
I predicted that Diverse-strategy dyads would self-report more productive
discussions (Hypothesis 5A) and better perceived performance (Hypothesis 5B) than
Same-strategy dyads on post-session questionnaires. Hypothesis 5A was tested with a
one-way ANOVA, with strategy diversity condition as the between-subjects factor. Item
9 from the P2-Post questionnaire (“How beneficial was discussing with your teammate in
helping your team perform better?”) served as the dependent measure for productive
discussion. The effect of strategy diversity condition on self-reported discussion
productivity was significant, F (2, 63) = 4.26, p < .05, partial η2 = .12. This would
suggest that productivity of discussion differed between participants in the Diversestrategy (M = 8.62, SD = 1.54), Same-strategy/Add-Two (M = 7.42, SD = 1.74), and
Same-strategy/Use-Three conditions (M = 8.57, SD = 1.29). A planned contrast revealed
a marginal effect suggesting that Diverse-strategy groups may have reported more
productive discussions than groups in the two Same-strategy conditions, t (63) = 1.54, p =
.06 (one-tailed), r = .19, in support of Hypothesis 5A. A post hoc comparison using the
Tukey HSD test revealed that Same-strategy/Use-Three groups reported significantly
more productive discussions (M = 8.57, SD = 1.29) than Same-strategy/Add-Two groups
(M = 7.42, SD = 1.74, p < .05). The latter difference was not predicted in advance. Thus,
Hypothesis 5A was only weakly supported by the marginal results of the planned
contrast.
Hypothesis 5B was tested with 3 one-way ANOVAs, with items 2, 3, and 4 from
the questionnaire (How confident are you that your team performed better than
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25%/50%/75% of teams of students in introductory psychology classes who might sign
up for this study?”) serving as dependent measures for perceived performance. The effect
of strategy diversity condition on self-perceived performance (better than 25% of other
participants) was not significant, F (2, 63) = .08, p = .923, partial η2 = .00, suggesting that
self-perceived performance did not differ between participants in the Diverse-strategy (M
= 7.36, SD = 1.49), Same-strategy/Add-Two (M = 7.18, SD = 1.75), and Samestrategy/Use-Three (M = 7.34, SD = 1.68) conditions. The effect of strategy diversity
condition on self-perceived performance (better than 50% of other participants) was not
significant, F (2, 63) = .27, p = .763, partial η2 = .01, suggesting that self-perceived
performance did not differ between participants in the Diverse-strategy (M = 6.50, SD =
1.70), Same-strategy/Add-Two (M = 6.27, SD = 1.77), and Same-strategy/Use-Three (M
= 6.66, SD = 1.78) conditions. The effect of strategy diversity condition on self-perceived
performance (better than 75% of other participants) was not significant, F (2, 63) = .48, p
= .482, partial η2 = .02, suggesting that self-perceived performance did not differ between
participants in the Diverse-strategy (M = 5.57, SD = 1.92), Same-strategy/Add-Two (M =
5.14, SD = 1.76), and Same-strategy/Use-Three (M = 5.82, SD = 1.97) conditions.
An additional exploratory analysis was conducted to test Hypothesis 5B,
combining the three confidence measures into a single repeated-measures factor. A
mixed-model ANOVA was conducted, with the combined confidence measure as a
repeated-measures factor and strategy diversity condition as the between-subjects factor.
The main effect of confidence ratings was significant, F (2, 126) = 111.87, p < .001,
partial η2 = .64. Not surprisingly, this suggests that confidence in besting these standards
differed between ratings. The main effect of strategy diversity condition was not

significant, F (2, 63) = .34, p = .709, partial η = .01. This suggests that confidence
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ratings did not differ between participants in the Diverse-strategy (M = 6.48, SD = 1.70),
Same-strategy/Add-Two (M = 6.20, SD = 1.76), and Same-strategy/Use-Three (M = 6.61,
SD = 1.81) conditions. The interaction between confidence ratings and strategy diversity
condition was also not significant, F (4, 126) = 2.59, p = .820, partial η2 = .03, suggesting
that the relationship between strategy diversity condition and level of confidence in
besting each standard did not differ between ratings. Greenhouse-Geisser corrections
were employed in this analysis due to the assumption of sphericity being violated
(Mauchly’s W = .452, p < .001). Thus, Hypothesis 5B was not supported.
Hypothesis 6
I predicted that Diverse-strategy dyads would be rated by observers as having
more productive discussions than Same-strategy dyads. This hypothesis was tested with
several one-way ANOVAs, with strategy diversity condition as the between-subjects
factor. Dependent measures included coded behaviors (Appendix G) as well as team
climate ratings for relationship (conflict vs. cooperation) and discussion activity (active
vs. passive). One coded behavior, Metastrategy statements, was not observed in any
sessions, and thus was omitted from the analyses. Results of these analyses are listed in
Table 3.
For Solutions to Letters statements, a planned contrast revealed that Diversestrategy groups made significantly fewer statements than Same-strategy groups, t (63) = 2.00, p < .05 (one-tailed), r = .24. A post hoc comparison using the Tukey HSD test
revealed, somewhat surprisingly, that Same-strategy/Use-Three groups may have made
more Solutions to Letters statements (M = 14.32, SD = 4.98) than Diverse-strategy
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groups (M = 11.14, SD = 4.48, p = .053). For Strategy Sharing (asking partner to share)
statements, a planned contrast revealed that there was no difference between Diversestrategy groups and Same-strategy groups, t (63) = -.53, p = .300 (one-tailed), r = .00. A
post hoc comparison using the Games-Howell test (chosen because of unequal variances)
revealed that participants in Same-strategy/Use-Three groups may have asked their
partners to share strategies more (M = .27, SD = .55) than participants in Samestrategy/Add-Two groups (M = .00, SD = .00, p = .074). Thus, observed behaviors did
not support Hypothesis 6.
Table 3. Results of ANOVA tests for observed group behaviors (Hypothesis 6). One
asterisk indicates marginal significance (p < .10), two asterisks indicate significance at
p < .05. Mean/SD columns include means and standard deviations (in parentheses).
Behavior
Explicit
Strategy
Strategy
Arguments
Solution to
Letters
Strategy
Sharing
(shallow)
Strategy
Sharing (deep)
Strategy
Sharing
(asking partner
to share)
Performance
Sharing
(shallow)
Performance
Sharing (deep)
Performance
Sharing
(asking partner
to share)

F (2, 63)

p

Partial
η2

Mean/SD
(Diverse)

Mean/SD
(Same/AddTwo)

Mean/SD
(Same/UseThree)

1.42

.250

.04

10.68
(3.36)

8.96 (4.07)

10.59 (4.03)

.52

.595

.02

1.05 (1.40)

.68 (1.17)

.96 (1.09)

2.83

.066*

.08

11.14
(4.48)

12.59 (3.78)

14.32 (4.98)

.85

.433

.03

.32 (.57)

.18 (.40)

.14 (.47)

1.71

.190

.05

.27 (.70)

.18 (.50)

.55 (.80)

3.27

.045**

.09

.09 (.29)

.00 (.00)

.27 (.55)

.32

.728

.01

.23 (.75)

.18 (.59)

.09 (.29)

1.55

.220

.05

.00 (.00)

.09 (.29)

.23 (.69)

1.03

.362

.032

.09 (.29)

.00 (.00)

.05 (.21)
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For team climate ratings, the effect of strategy diversity condition on relationship
(conflict vs. cooperation) was significant, F (2, 63) = 3.46, p < .05, partial η2 = .10,
suggesting that relationship differed between participants in the Diverse-strategy (M =
9.32, SD = .57), Same-strategy/Add-Two (M = 8.82, SD = 1.25) and Same-strategy/UseThree (M = 9.45, SD = .51) conditions. A planned contrast revealed that Diverse-strategy
groups did not report more conflict or cooperation than Same-strategy groups, t (63) =
.82, p = .207 (one-tailed), r = .10. A post hoc comparison using the Tukey HSD test
revealed that Same-strategy/Use-Three groups reported significantly more cooperation
(less conflict) (M = 9.45, SD = .51) than Same-strategy/Add-Two groups (M = 8.82, SD =
1.25, p < .05). The effect of strategy diversity condition on discussion activity (active vs.
passive) was also significant, F (2, 63) = 4.69, p < .05, partial η2 = .13, suggesting that
discussion activity differed between participants in the Diverse-strategy (M = 8.36, SD =
1.59), Same-strategy/Add-Two (M = 7.55, SD = 2.41) and Same-strategy/Use-Three (M =
9.14, SD = .77) conditions. A planned contrast revealed that Diverse-strategy groups did
not report more or less active discussions than Same-strategy groups, t (63) = .05, p =
.480 (one-tailed), r = .01. A post hoc comparison using the Games-Howell test (again
chosen because of unequal variances) revealed that Same-strategy/Use-Three groups
reported significantly more active discussions (M = 9.14, SD = .77) than Samestrategy/Add-Two groups (M = 7.55, SD = 2.41, p < .05). Thus, team climate ratings did
not support Hypothesis 6.
Study 1 Discussion
The purpose of Study 1 was to investigate the role of diversity in group problemsolving process and performance. Participants attempted to solve two letters-to-numbers
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problems, the first as individuals and the second as members of a two-person team. For
the first problem, participants were given a strategy to solve the problem and were
required to use it. Participants were assigned to one of three strategy diversity conditions;
in the two Same-strategy conditions the teammates’ strategies matched, while in the third
Diverse-strategy condition they differed. For the second problem, participants were free
to discuss their strategies with their partners and attempt to solve the second letters-tonumbers problem as a team using whichever strategy or combination of strategies they
desired, with no restrictions on the strategies that could be used. An additional strategy
was offered for the team to consider. It was expected that Diverse-strategy groups would
outperform Same-strategy groups on the task due to improved information processing
and use of more efficient strategies, prompted by discussion driven by the diversity of
opinions within the groups.
Hypothesis 1 predicted that Diverse-strategy groups would perform better than
Same-strategy groups, with performance measured by the average number of letters in
the code solved per trials used. Results did not support this prediction, as there was no
evidence of a main effect of strategy diversity condition, nor an interaction between
strategy diversity condition and letters-to-numbers problem. These results suggest that
the strategy diversity manipulations may not have affected performance as expected.
Hypothesis 2 predicted that Diverse-strategy groups would demonstrate superior
information processing (proposing more complex equations during the task and chancing
more exploratory guesses) than Same-strategy groups. For equation complexity, the
between-conditions contrast was only marginally significant, but in the predicted
direction. For guessing strategy, the between-conditions contrast supported predictions,
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partially supporting Hypothesis 2. Thus, Diverse-strategy groups proposed more
exploratory guesses, but there was only marginal evidence that they used more complex
equations, compared to Same-strategy groups. These results may suggest that
interventions designed to influence group information processing may not affect all
aspects of that processing equally.
Hypothesis 3 predicted that Diverse-strategy groups would be more likely than
Same-strategy groups to use outside advice in the form of a more complex but potentially
more useful strategy for the second problem. Results suggested that there was no
difference in the use of this outside advice between strategy diversity conditions, and so
Hypothesis 3 was not supported. It is possible that intragroup diversity does not impact a
group’s consideration of outside advice at all, or that there are other factors that might
affect a problem-solver’s consideration or use of outside advice. One such factor,
confidence in one’s own strategy, is explored further in Study 2 with individuals.
Hypothesis 4 predicted that the tendency to use the more complex Add All Unknown
strategy would mediate the relationship between strategy diversity condition and lettersto-numbers performance, with Diverse-strategy groups being more likely to use the Add
All Unknown strategy. Preliminary conditions necessary to test mediation were not met,
and so Hypothesis 4 was not supported.
In addition to performance and information processing behaviors, Study 1 also
examined group activity through the use of self-report questionnaires completed by
participants and observer ratings of team dynamics. Hypothesis 5 predicted that
participants in Diverse-strategy groups would report more productive group discussions
and better self-perceived performance than participants in Same-strategy groups. Results
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provided only marginal evidence that Diverse-strategy groups may have had more
productive discussions than Same-strategy groups. There was no evidence that selfperceived performance differed between strategy diversity conditions. Since other
analyses of group discussion and performance also did not suggest predicted differences
between conditions, these results may suggest that participants’ perceptions of their own
group’s dynamics and performance were simply accurate.
Observers analyzed video-recordings of group discussions to examine
productivity of discussions and rated general team climate. Out of 9 categories of
behaviors, only two showed evidence of differences (one only marginally) between
strategy diversity conditions, and the pattern of results did not support predictions in line
with Hypothesis 6. For team climate ratings, there was no evidence that Diverse-strategy
groups differed from Same-strategy groups in conflict (vs. cooperation) or general
activity levels of discussion. It is possible that any behavioral differences between
conditions were not captured by the behavioral coding and team climate rating measures,
both of which were relatively new measures designed by the principal investigator.

CHAPTER THREE
STUDY 2
Study 2 explored the influence of confidence when considering outside advice at
the individual level. Confidence was considered as a potential moderator or mediator of
effects observed in previous advice-taking studies; instead of factors
increasing/decreasing a decision-maker’s tendency to consider or use outside advice
directly, such factors may increase/decrease the decision-maker’s confidence in his/her
judgment or ability, and this in turn may drive them to seek advice. As in Study 1,
participants attempted to solve two letters-to-numbers problems. However, they
attempted to solve both problems as individuals (never in teams with other participants,
unlike Study 1). Participants were randomly assigned to either high-confidence or lowconfidence conditions. Confidence in one’s assigned strategy was manipulated by
altering the letters-to-numbers program to provide more (high-confidence) or less (lowconfidence) useful answers to equations that participants submitted to the program as
they attempted to solve the code. The following predictions were tested:
Hypothesis 7: Low-confidence individuals will outperform high-confidence
individuals on the second letters-to-numbers problem, with performance measured in the
same way as in Study 1: Letters solved per trial used, and using fewer trials to solve the
code overall.
Hypothesis 8: Low-confidence individuals will be more likely than high50
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confidence individuals to use outside advice (in the form of the more complex but
potentially more efficient Add All Unknown strategy).
Hypothesis 9A: The tendency to use the more complex Add All Unknown
strategy will mediate the relationship between self-reported confidence and letters-tonumbers performance.
Hypothesis 9B: Self-reported confidence will mediate the relationship between
strategy confidence condition and letters-to-numbers performance.
Hypothesis 9C: Both self-reported confidence and the tendency to use the more
complex Add All Unknown strategy will mediate the relationship between strategy
confidence condition and letters-to-numbers performance, with lower confidence
predicting the tendency to use the Add All Unknown strategy. See Figure 1 for the
predicted path analysis model.
Figure 1. Mediation path analysis model for Hypothesis 9C. Solid lines indicate predicted
significant relationships.
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Study 2 Method
Participants
Sixty participants were recruited for Study 2, based on the same criteria for
sample size calculation as Study 1 (80% power with a small to moderate effect size).
Undergraduate students from introductory psychology classes were recruited for the
study. Participants were randomly assigned to one of two strategy confidence conditions
and attempted to solve two letters-to-numbers problems. For their participation, students
earned credits toward fulfilling a research participation course requirement. Participants
also had the opportunity to enter the same raffle as Study 1 participants.
Experimental Task
Participants in Study 2 attempted to solve two letters-to-numbers problems with
the same general structure as in Study 1.
Experimental Conditions
Instead of manipulating equation strategies, all participants were instructed to use
the Add Two strategy as described in Study 1. Participants were assigned to one of two
strategy confidence conditions (high or low). For participants assigned to the highconfidence condition, the letters-to-numbers program was manipulated to always produce
a two-digit answer to the first equation that participants submitted to the program, as in
Study 1. For low-confidence participants, the program delayed (as long as was possible
with the unused numbers available) the occurrence of a two-digit answer. The latter was
intended to make the problem more difficult and cause participants to question the
effectiveness of their problem-solving strategy.
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Procedure
With the exception of the experimental manipulation, procedures for Study 2 were
similar to those for Study 1. Participants were administered the same informed consent
process, compensated with both research participation credits and a chance to win a raffle
prize (if desired), completed the tutorial and two letters-to-numbers problems (being
forced to use the Add Two strategy on the first problem, but having the choice to use the
Add All Unknown strategy on the second problem), and answered a questionnaire after
each problem (see Appendices D and F). Participants in Study 2 were the only participant
in the laboratory room for the experiment session.
Measures
Letters-to-Numbers Process and Performance
The measures for participants’ progress through the letters-to-numbers problems
and their performance were the same as in Study 1.
Confidence
Confidence was also measured the same way as in Study 1, although both
questionnaires asked participants to assess themselves as individuals (instead of as a team
for the second problem as in Study 1).
Study 2 Results
Hypothesis 7
I predicted that individuals in the low-confidence condition would outperform
individuals in the high-confidence condition on the second letters-to-numbers problem.
Again, performance was poorer than expected. 50% of participants failed to solve the
first problem, and 25% failed to solve the second problem. The average number of letters
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solved per trials used again served as a performance measure (for the same reasons given
in Study 1). This hypothesis was tested with a one-way ANOVA, with strategy
confidence condition as a between-subjects factor. The effect of strategy confidence
condition on performance was marginally significant, F (1, 58) = 2.96, p = .091, partial η2
= .05. This suggests that participants in the low-confidence condition (M = 1.31, SD =
.54) may have performed better than participants in the high-confidence condition (M =
1.09, SD = .45). Thus, Hypothesis 7 was only weakly supported by this marginal result.
Hypothesis 8
I predicted that individuals in the low-confidence condition would be more likely
than individuals in the high-confidence condition to use outside advice (in the form of the
more complex but potentially more efficient Add All Unknown strategy) on the second
problem. The tendency to use this strategy was measured as the proportion of trials on
which the strategy was used. This hypothesis was tested with a one-way ANOVA, with
strategy confidence condition as the between-subjects factor. The effect of strategy
confidence condition on the tendency to use this strategy was significant, F (1, 58) =
7.57, p < .01, partial η2 = .12. This suggests that participants in the low-confidence
condition (M = .15, SD = .25) used this strategy more than participants in the highconfidence condition (M = .02, SD = .05). Thus, Hypothesis 8 was supported.
Hypothesis 9
I predicted that the tendency to use the more complex Add All Unknown strategy
would mediate the relationship between self-reported confidence and letters-to-numbers
performance (Hypothesis 9A), with lower self-reported confidence correlating with
increased likelihood of using the Add All Unknown strategy, and increased use of this
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strategy correlating with better performance. Confidence was measured with items 2, 3,
and 4 from the P1-Post questionnaire (“How confident are you that you performed better
than 25%/50%/75% of all of the students in introductory psychology classes who might
sign up for this study?”).
I conducted three one-way ANOVAs as a manipulation check for the three
confidence measures, with strategy confidence condition as the between-subjects factor.
For the “better than 25%” measure, the difference between strategy confidence conditions
was not significant, F (1, 58) = 1.13, p = .292, partial η2 = .02. This suggests that the selfreported confidence for participants in the low-confidence condition (M = 5.37, SD =
2.30) and those in the high-confidence condition (M = 4.70, SD = 2.55) did not differ. For
the “better than 50%” measure, the difference between strategy confidence conditions
was not significant, F (1, 58) = 2.20, p = .143, partial η2 = .04. This suggests that the selfreported confidence for participants in the low-confidence condition (M = 4.60, SD =
2.18) and those in the high-confidence condition (M = 3.77, SD = 2.18) did not differ. For
the “better than 75%” measure, the difference between strategy confidence conditions
was not significant, F (1, 58) = .69, p = .411, partial η2 =.01. This suggests that the selfreported confidence for participants in the low-confidence condition (M = 3.73, SD =
2.21) and those in the high-confidence condition (M = 3.27, SD = 2.15) did not differ.
The pattern of means (with low-confidence participants reporting higher—though not
statistically significantly—self-reported confidence) was unexpected.
A path analysis approach would have been used to test relationships between
strategy confidence condition, self-reported confidence, the tendency to use the Add All
Unknown strategy, and performance based on the mediation approach discussed by
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Baron & Kenny (1986). Multiple variations of this model were considered, using the
three different confidence measures separately, as well as analyzing data from
participants in the two strategy confidence conditions combined in one sample and as two
separate samples. Despite this varied approach, the data did not support the proposed
mediation model(s). Preliminary conditions for mediation (testing correlations between
variables in the model) did not provide the necessary circumstances for conducting a
mediation analysis. In order to test the prediction that the tendency to use the Add All
Unknown strategy mediates the relationship between self-reported confidence and
performance (Hypothesis 9A), three preliminary conditions must hold: 1) self-reported
confidence and performance are correlated, 2) self-reported confidence and the tendency
to use the Add All Unknown strategy are correlated, 3) the tendency to use the Add All
Unknown strategy and performance are correlated, while controlling for the relationship
between self-reported confidence and performance. In order to test the prediction that
self-reported confidence mediates the relationship between strategy confidence condition
and performance (Hypothesis 9B), similar conditions would need to hold: 1) strategy
confidence condition and performance are correlated, 2) strategy confidence condition
and self-reported confidence are correlated, 3) self-reported confidence and performance
are correlated, while controlling for the relationship between strategy confidence
condition and performance. Correlation matrices used to test these steps are presented in
Tables 4 and 5. Table 4 presents correlations between variables for all participants in both
strategy confidence conditions. Table 5 presents correlations between variables for highconfidence (above diagonal) and low-confidence (below diagonal) participants
separately. As can be seen from the data, the necessary correlational relationships
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between variables are not present, and resulted in non-significant path coefficients in the
preliminary mediation analyses. Thus, Hypotheses 9A and 9B were not supported.
Hypothesis 9C assumed that Hypotheses 9A and 9B would be supported, and so it was
also not supported. Overall, Hypothesis 9 was not supported.
An additional path analysis model was considered to explore an alternative
mediation model. This model would test the hypothesis that the tendency to use the more
complex Add All Unknown strategy mediates the relationship between strategy
confidence condition (replacing self-reported confidence in the previous analyses) and
letters-to-numbers performance, with participants in the low-confidence condition being
more likely to use the Add All Unknown strategy than participants in the high-confidence
condition, and increased use of this strategy correlating with better performance.
Correlations between variables used to test this model are included in Table 4.
Although the direct relationship between strategy confidence condition and
performance was not statistically significant, a bootstrapping approach was used to test
the possible indirect effect of strategy diversity condition on performance through the use
of the Add All Unknown strategy, following procedures suggested by Preacher & Hayes
(2004). The analysis provides results for the bootstrapping test as well as the Sobel test,
an alternative approach to testing indirect mediation effects (Sobel, 1982). The
bootstrapping test, based on 5000 resamples, suggested that the indirect effect was not
significant; the 95% Confidence Interval included zero: [-.22, .04]. Increasing the number
of resamples did not significantly alter results. The results of the Sobel test also suggested
that the indirect effect was not significant, z = -1.56, p = .119. Thus, the alternative
mediation model was not supported.
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Table 4. Correlations between variables for all participants used to test mediation models.
Right-hand column provides standard deviations for all variables. Two asterisks indicate
significant correlations at p < .01. One asterisk indicates significant correlations at
p < .05.
Strategy
Proportion of
Confid- Confid- ConfidConfidence
Trials used
ence
ence
ence
SD
Condition
Add All
(50%)
(25%)
(75%)
(Low/High)
Unknown
Strategy
Confidence
.504
Condition
(Low/High)
Confidence
-.191
2.198
(50%)
Confidence
-.138
.898**
2.428
(25%)
Confidence
-.108
.888**
.668**
2.175
(75%)
Proportion of
Trials used
-.340**
-.062
-.033
-.059
.193
Add All
Unknown
-.220
.273*
.299*
.181
.312*
.502
Performance
Table 5. Correlations between variables used to test mediation models, with correlations
for high-confidence (above diagonal) and low-confidence (below diagonal) participants
presented separately. The two right-most columns provide standard deviations for all
variables in each group. Two asterisks indicate significant correlations at p < .01. One
asterisk indicates significant correlations at p < .05.
Proportion
Confid- Confid- Confid- of Trials
SD
SD
Perforence
ence
ence
(Low (High
used Add
mance
(50%)
(25%)
(75%)
All
Conf.) Conf.)
Unknown
Confidence
.895** .899**
-.226
.404*
2.175
2.176
(50%)
Confidence
.900**
.670**
-.360
.419*
2.297
2.548
(25%)
Confidence
.880** .658**
-.033
.295
2.212
2.149
(75%)
Proportion
of Trials
-.151
-.046
-.139
-.181
.253
.054
used Add All
Unknown
.108
.154
.055
.375*
.537
.446
Performance

59
Study 2 Discussion
Study 2 further explored the role of confidence in an individual problem-solver’s
tendency to consider outside advice. Individual participants attempted to solve two
letters-to-numbers problems. Similar to Study 1, participants were required to use a
specific equation strategy for solving the first problem, and were offered the alternative
Add All Unknown strategy to consider using when attempting to solve the second
problem, with no restrictions on equations that could be used for the second problem.
Unlike Study 1, all participants were given the same strategy to use on the first problem
(the Add Two strategy). Participants were randomly assigned to one of two strategy
confidence conditions, intended to promote high or low confidence in the strategy used
for the first problem as an effective strategy to use again for the second problem. It was
predicted that low-confidence participants would perform better on the second problem
(solving for more letters per trials used), and that this may result from an increased
tendency to consider and use the outside advice, with this use of outside advice mediating
the relationship between self-reported strategy confidence and performance. Results
provided marginal evidence that low-confidence participants may have performed better
than high-confidence participants on the second problem, possibly supporting Hypothesis
7. Results also suggested that low-confidence participants were more likely than highconfidence participants to consider and use the outside advice, supporting Hypothesis 8.
However, the predicted mediation model was not supported by the data, contradicting
Hypothesis 9. Preliminary conditions necessary to test mediation effects were not met,
despite various exploratory approaches to conducting this analysis. An alternative
mediation model was considered, proposing that the use of the outside advice would
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mediate the relationship between strategy confidence condition (instead of self-reported
confidence) and performance. However, this model was also not supported.

CHAPTER FOUR
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The purpose of these studies was to investigate factors that may influence the
extent to which both groups and individuals will consider or use outside advice when
attempting to solve a problem. A long history of research within psychology and other
disciplines supports evolutionary perspectives that, throughout our evolutionary history,
we tend to affiliate with others and seek their aid when confronting problems. This is
characteristic of modern humans as well, with recent studies in psychology and
organizational behavior demonstrating our preference to work with others over facing our
problems alone. However, there appear to be circumstances in which we stubbornly shun
the help or advice of others. The present studies investigated some factors that may
contribute to this behavior.
Study 1 focused on the behavior of collaborative problem-solving groups (twoperson dyads), and the role of intragroup diversity in groups’ tendency to consider or use
advice from a source outside the group. Diversity was presented in the form of group
members’ experience with one of two particular strategies to use to solve the problem
that the group was tasked with solving. An experimental manipulation was introduced to
give group members experience with either the same or different strategies. When paired
with partners to perform the task as a team, these Same-strategy or Diverse-strategy
groups were also given outside advice (a third strategy) to consider. Groups were
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free to discuss their own strategies and the given advice while attempting to solve the
problem. Previous research suggests that diversity within groups may prompt conflict and
subsequent discussion to resolve that conflict, potentially leading to innovation and
improved performance (Carton & Cummings, 2012; Franz, 2012). In contrast, relatively
homogeneous groups may never experience such conflict, leading to more cooperative
but ultimately suboptimal performance as these groups prioritize consensus over
potentially disruptive innovation or deliberation. Following this logic, it was expected in
Study 1 that Diverse-strategy groups, compared to Same-strategy groups, would be more
likely to consult and utilize outside advice to resolve their inter-member differences,
demonstrate superior information processing, have more productive group discussions,
and perform better on the task. Results generally did not support these predictions; a few
possible explanations are considered.
First, it is possible that the predicted relationship between intragroup diversity and
group performance does not manifest when performance is constrained to intellective
tasks like the letters-to-numbers problem. To the author’s knowledge, this is the first
study examining the relationships between intragroup diversity, advice-taking, and
performance on an intellective task. Intellective tasks are notable for having
demonstrably correct solutions, and a series of logical intermediate steps to arrive at those
solutions. When groups perform such tasks, a correct solution or efficient method for
performing the task successfully can be demonstrated by an individual to their group
members (Laughlin, 2011). I expected that such tasks might be particularly useful for
studying various aspects of group process and performance. While performing such tasks,
participants could presumably demonstrate ideas to fellow group members more easily
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than on tasks with no definitive solution or ambiguous processes to arrive at that solution.
If group members differ in their solution strategies and approaches to the task, and an
outside source of information was available, group members may be able to take
advantage of the demonstrable nature of the task to argue in favor of a specific strategy
(that is also demonstrable), and such discussions might drive more innovative solutions
than if there was no discussion. This perspective may be misguided; the demonstrable
nature of the task may not impact group discussions or individual perspectives on
consulting outside advice. Alternatively, the letters-to-numbers task, at least as it was
presented in this study, may be less demonstrable than previously thought. The
demonstrability of a group task depends in part on group members’ abilities to
understand, perform, and demonstrate the task to their fellow group members (Larson,
2010, Laughlin, 2011; Laughlin & Ellis, 1986). Poor performance on the task overall in
the studies presented here may suggest that these criteria were not met. The predicted
effects may manifest with other intellective tasks with a higher degree of demonstrability.
Future research should continue probing how characteristics of a task might influence
participants’ behavior while performing it, beyond hypotheses related to more finegrained effects.
Second, there may be mechanical limitations of the letters-to-numbers task itself.
Earlier I discussed the issue of measuring performance for participants that fail to solve
the letters-to-numbers code(s) and the use of a substitute performance measure (average
numbers of letters solved per trials used, instead of the more traditional measure of letters
used to solve the code in its entirety). It is unclear if this is an appropriate alternative
measure. If data from previous letters-to-numbers studies were to be analyzed with this
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alternative performance measure as a dependent variable, the results may not support the
same conclusions. Further, previous studies did not report failure rates of participants (the
number of participants, if any, who failed to solve similar letters-to-numbers codes) in
those studies. It is not clear if the proportion of participants who failed to solve one or
both letters-to-numbers problems in the studies presented here was unique to these
studies; the results of previous letters-to-numbers studies—specifically, mean
performance scores measured as trials used to solve the code—suggest that failure rates
for those studies were not as high as in the two studies presented here. Considering that
“successful” performance of participants on a task can never be guaranteed, future
problem-solving researchers are strongly encouraged to consider the tasks used to
measure performance and the performance measures specific to a given task, to avoid
similar difficulties in interpreting performance data. In some cases a specific task may not
be appropriate for a variety of reasons, or some adjustments to its administration may be
required. If such adjustments are made, researchers should be cautious when interpreting
findings in comparison to results from previous studies using a variation of the same task.
Other variations of the letters-to-numbers task to resolve these difficulties, or the use of
an alternative task to measure individual and group performance, may be beneficial for
future research endeavors.
Third, experimental manipulations of intragroup diversity may not have been
sufficiently robust to produce the intended effects on advice-taking, group behaviors, or
performance. Previous theories that consider the influence of diversity on group process
and performance suggest a curvilinear relationship, with moderate diversity being
optimal for groups to reap the benefits (Carton & Cummings, 2012). If there is too little
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diversity, the group may not innovate nor engage in effortful discussion. If there is too
much diversity, irreconcilable conflict may stifle group progress. Of these two extremes,
the former seems more likely in Study 1. The observational analyst (viewing recordings
of group discussions) noted relatively low levels of discussion overall within groups, and
highly cooperative (vs. conflictual) behavior. Regardless of strategy diversity condition,
groups also rarely consulted, discussed, or used the outside advice. Although individual
participants were temporarily required to adhere to a specific strategy, they might not
have internalized this strategy as their own, nor felt motivated to defend it as a good
strategy in group discussion. Thus, any predicted effects of diversity may not have been
observed simply because the diversity itself was not truly present. Future studies on
intragroup diversity should consider alternative methods of manipulating or creating
diversity within groups, or perhaps strategic recruitment of participants to take advantage
of existing diversity within participant samples, to create stronger perceptions of
differences between group members.
Potential difficulties in operationalizing experimental conditions and limitations
of the letters-to-numbers task may have extended to Study 2, conducted with individual
participants. The goal of Study 2 was to examine how an individual problem-solver’s
confidence in his/her own problem-solving strategy might affect his/her tendency to
consider an alternative strategy presented in the form of outside advice. It was predicted
that individuals induced to have low confidence in their given strategy on the first
problem would be more likely to consider outside advice and perform better on the
second problem, compared to those induced to have higher confidence in their given
strategy on the first problem. Low-confidence individuals were expected to be frustrated
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or disappointed with their apparent ineffective strategy, and to defect to the strategy
offered by the outside advice, leading to better performance on the second problem
compared to high-confidence individuals who might have remained loyal to their given
strategy.
Results of Study 2 did support some predictions. Low-confidence individuals did
use the strategy offered by the outside advice more than high-confidence individuals,
although participants in both conditions used the alternative strategy offered by the
advice less than was expected. Analysis of performance yielded only marginally
significant statistical differences between conditions, providing inconclusive evidence of
a relationship between strategy confidence condition and performance. I also predicted a
mediation effect, with the use of outside advice mediating the relationship between selfreported strategy confidence and performance. The proposed mediation model could not
be fully tested since preliminary conditions for mediation were not met. An alternative
mediation model proposing that the use of outside advice would mediate the relationship
between strategy confidence condition (instead of self-reported strategy confidence) and
performance was also not supported. The proposed mediation effects may not operate as
expected, or the measures used may not have accurately represented the constructs
underlying the proposed models.
Similar to Study 1, experimental manipulations in Study 2 may not have been
robust enough to produce desired effects. As participants were working to solve the first
letters-to-numbers problem, the computer program used to administer the task
dynamically adjusted difficulty, making the problem more difficult for low-confidence
participants and easier for high-confidence participants as they attempted to solve it. The
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difference between the “difficult” and “easy” versions of the task may not have been
dramatic enough to affect perceptions of participants as intended, resulting in confidence
levels between low-confidence and high-confidence participants not being different
enough in magnitude to influence consideration of outside advice in the predicted
manner. Presenting participants with more than one letters-to-numbers problem to solve
using a specific strategy might strengthen such a manipulation. Alternative methods of
manipulating confidence might also be developed, although ethical considerations may
prevent researchers from inducing radical changes in participants’ confidence in their
abilities or other thoughts or behaviors. Overly strong manipulations may also be too
obvious to participants, and lead to biased behavior due to experimental demand. Future
research should continue exploring how to best achieve balance between these concepts.
Also similar to Study 1, some participants in Study 2 failed to solve one or both of
the letters-to-numbers problems. If a task is intended for groups of participants to
complete collaboratively, individuals may be even less likely than groups (with any
number of members) to be able to solve it. Researchers that seek to compare performance
of individuals and groups, or at least test performance of individuals and groups on the
same tasks, should consider whether the tasks can be used for both. The letters-tonumbers problems may simply have been too difficult and artificially reduced variance in
performance as a result. Attempts were made to make the problems easier to solve with
certain experimental manipulations, but these may not have been sufficient. Further
efforts to make the problem easier (e.g., if participants start the problem knowing which
letter represents the number 1) may resolve such issues, however it is also possible that
the problem may be made too easy as a result.
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Another issue potentially affecting both studies was how confidence was
measured. After completing each letters-to-numbers problem, participants responded to
questionnaire items asking them to rate their perceived performance against 25%, 50%,
and 75% of other participants that might participate in the study. Hypotheses were tested
with each of these measures separately, as well as with a measure that combined the three
confidence measures into a single repeated-measures factor. These may not have been
satisfactory measures for a confidence variable. Since confidence is such a widely studied
construct with many ways of defining and measuring it (Forsyth, 1999; Kruglanski &
Webster, 1996; Park & Hinsz, 2006; Tindale, 1989), there are no clear better alternatives
than what was presented here. Future efforts into evaluating the validity and reliability of
confidence measures, as well as more nuanced features (e.g., balancing the directness of a
measure with the need to avoid revealing purposes of the study) may benefit selection of
such measures for future studies. The measures used in these studies were exploratory
and were not rigorously tested for such criteria; the use of instruments or measures with a
more proven history might have strengthened the studies.
The concerns described thus far are primarily methodological in nature. However,
the mixed results of both studies might have also resulted from flawed theoretical
predictions. It seems premature to dismiss the possibility of relationships between
intragroup diversity and advice-taking, confidence and advice-taking, or how either of
these may impact individual or group performance given the significant findings in this
and other studies on advice-taking by individuals and groups. Such effects may simply
not manifest under the specific circumstances of the present studies. It is possible that
relationships between the main variables of interest are more complex than previously
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thought, and that additional intermediary variables may drive effects observed in other
studies. For example, previous studies have considered how an advisor’s apparent
expertise might affect a decision-maker’s tendency to consider their advice (Sniezek &
Van Swol, 2001). Inclusion of such additional variables may allow for a more fine-tuned
understanding of why we only sometimes consult an advisor when attempting to make a
decision or solve a problem.
It is also hoped that these studies contribute to the already expansive research
literature on both group diversity and confidence. Diversity and its impact on
interpersonal relationships continues to be a popular avenue of research in social
psychology and organizational behavior, as well as in other disciplines. Continued
interest in this topic (and the persistence of contradictory findings) speaks to the
complexity of the topic. Researchers should continue to explore new ways to define and
measure diversity to allow investigation into its effects (both positive and negative) on
various aspects of group life.
Confidence is also a persistently popular topic for research inquiry. The studies
reported here examined experimentally manipulated confidence specific to a certain
problem-solving task. Given the vast amount of motivational techniques intended to
improve our confidence in ourselves and our abilities, future studies should continue
exploring how confidence can be changed or manipulated, as well as how it can be best
measured. It may be more beneficial for research studies to consider specific types or
subtypes of confidence, such as self-confidence versus confidence in one’s group during
group tasks, instead of treating it as a broader construct.
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The studies presented here produced generally mixed findings, supporting some
theoretical predictions while failing to provide support for others. It is unclear whether
this is due to flaws in theoretical perspectives, flaws in methodological approach, some
combination of both, or simply an accurate picture of reality. Since methodological
shortcomings seem more likely to be the cause of failed hypotheses, some adjustments
and improvements to methods were offered. Alternative theoretical perspectives were
also presented for those wishing to explore these avenues.

APPENDIX A
“ADD TWO LETTERS” STRATEGY SHEET
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The “Add Two Letters” Strategy
Explanation:
Create equations by adding two letters together.
Examples:
A+B=
A+A=
C+J=
*Remember to include the equal sign (=) at the end of the
equations.

APPENDIX B
“USE THREE LETTERS” STRATEGY SHEET
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The “Use Three Letters” Strategy
Explanation:
Create equations that include 3 letters, using addition or
subtraction.
Examples:
A+B+C=
A+A+A=
B + CD =
BC + D =
C+D–E=
E–F+G=
A – DJ =
*Remember that two letters together (like CD) is a 2-digit
number, NOT multiplying C x D.
*Remember to include the equal sign (=) at the end of the
equations.

APPENDIX C
“ADD ALL UNKNOWN LETTERS” STRATEGY SHEET
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The “Add All Unknown Letters” Strategy
Explanation:
Create equations by adding together all of the letters that
you don’t know.
Examples:
(starting with no letters known):

A+B+C+D+E+F+G+H+I+J=
(if you already know A, B, E, and F):

C+D+G+H+I+J=
*Remember to include the equal sign (=) at the end of the
equations.

APPENDIX D
P1-POST QUESTIONNAIRE
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P1-Post Questionnaire
(After First Problem, Both studies)
The following questions will ask you about the Letters-to-Numbers problem you just
completed. Please read the questions carefully and answer them honestly. For each
question, circle a number on the answer scale to choose your answer.
1. How Easy or Difficult did you find the problem to be?
Very Easy – Very Difficult (1-10).

Your performance on the problems is measured by how many letters in the code you
figured out, and how many trials it took you to do it.

2. How confident are you that you performed better than 25% of all of the students in
introductory psychology classes who might sign up for this study?
Not at all confident – Extremely confident (1-10).
3. How confident are you that you performed better than 50% of all of the students in
introductory psychology classes who might sign up for this study?
Not at all confident – Extremely confident (1-10).
4. How confident are you that you performed better than 75% of all of the students in
introductory psychology classes who might sign up for this study?
Not at all confident – Extremely confident (1-10).

APPENDIX E
STUDY 1 P2-POST QUESTIONNAIRE
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Study 1 P2-Post Questionnaire
(After second problem, Study 1 only)
The following questions will ask you about the SECOND Letters-to-Numbers
problem you just completed. Please read the questions carefully and answer them
honestly. For each question, circle a number on the answer scale to choose your
answer. For open-ended questions, please write answers on the lines.
1. How Easy or Difficult did you find the problem to be?
Very Easy – Very Difficult (1-10).

Your performance on the problems is measured by how many letters in the code you
figured out, and how many trials it took you to do it.

2. How confident are you that your team performed better than 25% of teams of students
in introductory psychology classes who might sign up for this study?
Not at all confident – Extremely confident (1-10).
3. How confident are you that your team performed better than 50% of teams of students
in introductory psychology classes who might sign up for this study?
Not at all confident – Extremely confident (1-10).
4. How confident are you that your team performed better than 75% of teams of students
in introductory psychology classes who might sign up for this study?
Not at all confident – Extremely confident (1-10).

5. How much did your team consider or use the strategy given to you for the second
problem?
Not at all – Very Much (1-10).
6. Would you consider your team discussion as being more conflict or cooperation?
Mostly conflict – Mostly cooperation (1-10).
7. Would you consider your team discussion as being more awkward or smooth?
Mostly awkward – Mostly smooth (1-10).
8. Did your or your teammate take on more of a leadership role?
I lead – Neither – My teammate lead (1-10).
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9. How beneficial was discussing with your teammate in helping your team perform
better?
Not at all beneficial – Very beneficial (1-10).

10. How well did you know your teammate before today?
We’re total strangers – We know each other very well (1-10).

Gender: __________
Age: __________
Year in School:
Freshman
Major: __________

Sophomore

Junior

Senior

Do you know (or think you can guess) what the experiment is about?
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
____________

APPENDIX F
STUDY 2 P2-POST QUESTIONNAIRE
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Study 2 P2-Post Questionnaire
(After second problem, Study 2 only)
The following questions will ask you about the Letters-to-Numbers problem you just
completed. Please read the questions carefully and answer them honestly. For each
question, circle a number on the answer scale to choose your answer. For openended questions, please write answers on the lines.
1. How Easy or Difficult did you find the problem to be?
Very Easy – Very Difficult (1-10).

Your performance on the problems is measured by how many letters in the code you
figured out, and how many trials it took you to do it.

2. How confident are you that you performed better than 25% of all of the students in
introductory psychology classes who might sign up for this study?
Not at all confident – Extremely confident (1-10).
3. How confident are you that you performed better than 50% of all of the students in
introductory psychology classes who might sign up for this study?
Not at all confident – Extremely confident (1-10).
4. How confident are you that you performed better than 75% of all of the students in
introductory psychology classes who might sign up for this study?
Not at all confident – Extremely confident (1-10).
5. How much did you consider or use the strategy given to you for the second problem?
Not at all – Very Much (1-10).

Gender: __________
Age: __________
Year in School:
Freshman
Major: __________

Sophomore

Junior

Senior

Do you know (or think you can guess) what the experiment is about?

APPENDIX G
VIDEO CODING SCHEME
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Video Coding Scheme
•

Explicit strategy – specific thoughts/suggestions about strategies. Items in
this category can be directly implemented and are concrete. Includes
equation ideas.
Examples:
“We should use more complex equations.”
“Maybe using bigger numbers will be more effective.”
“Should we use longer equations?”
“We need to solve for more letters at a time.”
“Maybe it is better to guess about letters we don’t know.”
“Let’s try the ‘Add All Unknown’ strategy to see if it works.”
“We should do A+C for our next equation.”
“Let’s try to figure out what F is.”

•

Metastrategy – General thoughts regarding strategy or characteristics of
strategy. Items are more abstract than those in the Explicit strategy category,
and cannot be directly implemented as concise actions.
Examples:
“Let’s evaluate the quality of our equations.”
“There have to be better strategies out there than what we’re doing.”
“Is there a way to do this in fewer trials?”

•

Strategy Arguments (supporting/opposing strategy ideas) – Opinions
regarding why any presented ideas are good or bad strategies for improving
performance.
Examples (strategy arguments in bold):
“We can’t use multiplication in our equations because the task doesn’t let us use
multiplication.”
“We should use longer equations because it helps us solve the code faster.”
“The ‘Add All’ strategy seems too complicated, let’s not use it.”

•

Solutions to Letters
Examples:
“I think that A=2 because…”
“B can’t be 4 because…”
“What if A was 3 and C was 6?”

•

Strategy Sharing – teammates share/discuss the strategy they used to solve
the first problem.
o Shallow sharing – identifying strategy used
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o Deep sharing – comparing strategies, evaluating effectiveness/utility of
each
o Asking partner to share
•

Performance Sharing – teammates share/discuss their performance on the
first problem.
o Shallow sharing – mentioning performance (# of trials, good/bad, etc.)
o Deep sharing – reflections on why performance was good/bad, or could be
improved
o Asking partner to share

•

Time spent discussing before action on second problem.
o “Action” defined as program input. Delay between initiating program and
a participant doing something with the computer.

•

Requesting assistance from experimenter.
o Reason and content of request.
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General Team Climate Coding
For each item in bold, circle the number or description that best describes what was
observed. ONLY APPLIES TO TEAMS (not individuals).

Energy:
1
2
3
[Low energy]

4

5

6

7

8

Interaction:
-5
-4
-3
[Awkward]

-2

-1

1

2

3

4

5
[Smooth]

Discussion/deliberation:
1
2
3
4
[Passive]

5

6

7

8

9

10
[Active]

Member contribution:
-5
-4
-3
-2
[A contributes more]

-1

1

2

3
4
5
[B contributes more]

Leadership:
-5
-4
-3
[A leads more]

-2

-1

1

2

3

4
5
[B leads more]

Relationship:
-5
-4
-3
[More conflict]

-2

-1

1

2

3

4
5
[More cooperation]

Performance:
Succeeded

Failed

9
10
[High energy]

Unclear

How to code behaviors:
Energy
LOW – Team is sluggish or uninterested in task.
HIGH – Team is energetic and engaged in task.
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Interaction
SMOOTH – Members seem comfortable working together.
AWKWARD – Members are uncomfortable or nervous working together.
Discussion/deliberation
ACTIVE – Discussion involves a lot of talking, debating, and “back-and-forth”
between members.
PASSIVE – Discussion involves little talking, members do not challenge each
other’s ideas, member just goes with partner’s ideas.
Member contribution
EQUAL – Members contribute roughly equally to the conversation and the task.
UNEQUAL – One member dominates or carries discussion and activity.
Leadership
A LEADS – Member farthest from camera leads team more.
B LEADS – Member closest to camera leads team more.
NONE/NEITHER – Neither member exhibits leadership, or they lead team
equally.
Relationship
CONFLICT – Members seem unable or unwilling to agree, “not on the same
page.”
COOPERATION – Members able to reach agreement through discussion (even if
they demonstrate some difference of opinion).
Performance
SUCCEEDED – Team solved the problem.
FAILED – Team did not solve the problem.
UNCLEAR – Not clear from video if team solved the problem or not (“finished”
or “done” does not always mean “solved.”).

Notes – note any other interesting features of video, or any issues with coding system
(e.g., if none of the coding options for an item fit what was observed).
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